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Using comprehensive bank-loan contract information, we show that the power of
a firm relative to its suppliers eases its terms of bank financing, specifically through
lower loan prices and less restrictive non-price contract terms. Our results are robust
to controlling for product-market competition. Supply chain power enables the firm
to achieve a greater level of control over its inventory, constituting a significant por-
tion of the reduction in its overall loan cost. We argue that it is important to consider
supply-chain related issues when analyzing the external-financing capacity of firms.
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1. INTRODUCTION
How does a firm’s interactions with its suppliers affect its ability to access financing? In
this paper, we use granular firm-level bank loan data to investigate how a firm’s power over its
suppliers affects the loan terms it receives in the bank-loan market. We show that supply chain
power eases the terms of the firm’s bank financing, both lowering its loan costs and easing
restrictions imposed by non-price contract terms. This relationship holds after controlling for
product-market competition, and does not depend on the type of supply chain, though we
find that creditors value arm’s-length supply chains more favorably than relationship-specific
supply chains.
Supply chain management (SCM) has become an increasingly important concern for firms
in the past few years. Articles in the popular press argue that firms around the world have been
forced to restructure their supply chains following significant political events such as Brexit,
the renegotiation of international trade treaties, predominantly by the United States (US), or
the threat of tariff wars between China and the US. Many of these articles also describe a
concomitant drop in the intensity of cross-border financial links such as cross-border loans.1
However, despite its growing importance, the finance and accounting literature has only
recently begun devoting attention to examining how a firm’s economic links with its suppli-
ers influences its financial policies. Examples include Boissay and Gropp (2013) who show
how credit-constrained firms that face liquidity shocks pass on a significant proportion of these
shocks to their suppliers. Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers (2008) document how firm dis-
tress related to bankruptcy filings is associated with significant negative stock price effects for
suppliers. Moon and Phillips (2017) show that firms with more outside-purchase contracts, in-
cluding those related to input supply and outsourcing, are less likely to use financial leverage,
thereby reducing the firm’s and its contracting parties’ expected cost of financial distress. Lian
(2017) shows that a supplier’s likelihood of financial distress is positively related to its major
customer’s financial distress status. Surprisingly little research has been done on whether the
power firms hold over their suppliers affects the terms on which they are able to access external
financing in the first place.2
1See, for example, “The global list”, The Economist, Briefing Section, January 26, 2019. The Economist describes the drop in global
integration as slowbalisation. It also discusses a decline in the volume of cross-border loans accompanying the drop in cross-border links.
2In contrast, a considerable amount of research has been carried out on the influence of product-market structure on firm policy (see for
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This is an important issue. Firms interact both with customers (through product markets)
and with suppliers. Firms usually face little choice in their customer base relative to their sup-
plier base. Hence, since product-market competition is more likely to be exogenous to the firm,
prior research has typically examined the effect of product-market competition on the firm in
isolation. However, this focus also has the potential of leading to biased conclusions. Valta
(2012), for example, shows that the cost of bank debt is systematically higher for firms that
operate in competitive product markets and that banks price financial contracts after taking
these competitive threats into account. However, if the firm is a monopsony with considerable
power over its suppliers, it may pass some of the effects of product-market competition up the
supply chain. If banks recognize this ability, they should likewise price supply chain interac-
tions into their contracts. Similarly, Houston, Lin, and Zhu (2016) show that a firm’s financial
distress significantly elevates the financing costs of its suppliers. However, if a supplier has
several major customers and can switch among them easily, an individual customer’s finan-
cial distress should have little or no impact on the financing capacity of the supplier. Bernard
(2016) shows that financially constrained firms avoid financial statement disclosure to mitigate
predation risk originating from a competitive product market. If, however, the supply chain
power of a firm can alleviate its external financing constraints, a distressed firm does not nec-
essarily have to rely on modifying its disclosure practices to address the risk of product-market
predation. Finally, while a number of authors have shown that the presence of excess inven-
tory hurts the financial and operating performance of firms (Sloan, 1996; Thomas and Zhang,
2002; Belo and Lin, 2012), supply chain power might enable a firm to reduce its inventory.3
It is unclear, however, that the cost of external financing will always decline when the firm’s
supply chain power increases. For example, consider the choice of supplier the firm uses to
source its inputs. Deming (1986) suggests that a long-term, tightly integrated relationship
with a single source improves quality and lowers total costs. However, Rogerson (1992) ar-
gues that Deming’s approach may lead to a “hold-up” situation if contracts are incomplete. In
more extreme cases, strong coalitions of input providers may increase the bargaining power
example, Costello, 2013, 2017; Hui, Klasa, and Yeung, 2012; Hennessy and Livdan, 2009; Chu, 2012; Kale and Shahrur, 2007; Banerjee,
Dasgupta, and Kim, 2008; Campello and Gao, 2017; Houston et al., 2016). In particular, researchers have examined how the product-market
structure of firms influences its financial statement disclosures (Bernard, 2016), its cash holdings (Morellec, Nikolov, and Zucchi, 2013), its
cost of equity (Hou and Robinson, 2006; Hoberg and Phillips, 2010), the quantity of debt (MacKay and Phillips, 2005; Xu, 2012), and the
pricing of its debt (Valta, 2012).
3For example, in describing Honda’s inventory management system in the UK, Barker and Campbell (2018) note that orders from EU
suppliers arrive within 5 hours while others, such as customized car seats, arrive from local suppliers within 75 minutes before use.
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of suppliers relative to the firm (Nagarajan and Bassok, 2008; Nagarajan and Sosic, 2009),
extracting a larger surplus from the firm. Unforeseen supply-chain disruptions due to natural
and man-made disasters can also have detrimental impacts on firm profitability (Hendricks and
Singhal, 2005). In contrast to Deming, therefore, Porter (1985) suggests that the best way to
assure the firm low prices, high quality, and the lowest total cost is to have multiple sources
and competing suppliers. Hence, supply chain power may affect the likelihood of financial
distress and the cost of external financing in different ways. Tightly integrated suppliers allow
firms to control quality and allow flexible contracting opportunities, reducing default risk, but
expose the firm to supply chain related hold-up issues or supply disruptions, increasing default
risk. A relatively competitive suppliers’ market allows firms to manage themselves more effec-
tively during uncertain economic environments even if they do not have supply chain power,
lowering the possibility of financial distress.
Similarly, the extent to which a firm makes relationship-specific investments in its supply
chain can also affect the liquidity of the firm’s assets and, in turn, a financier’s potential losses,
should default occur. Reliance on a supply chain that requires relationship-specific investment
may decrease the market liquidity of a firm’s assets because these assets may have little value
outside the relationship. However, relationship-specific investment in the supply chain can
lead to lower leverage and greater bargaining power for firms, thereby lowering the risk of
default and liquidation (Titman, 1984; Maksimovic and Titman, 1991).
In our paper, we first develop several measures of a firm’s supply chain power. We use the
number of suppliers in the firm’s supply chain to capture the density of its supply chain. We
use the extent of dispersion in the dollar amounts of inputs sourced from different suppliers to
measure the degree to which a firm relies on heterogeneous input sources for its productive op-
eration. To measure the ability of a firm to extract more surplus from its supply chain, thereby
giving it a greater incentive to rely on the chain, we use a modified version of a Lerner’s index.
In each case, increasing values of these measures imply a greater power for the firm relative to
the suppliers on its supply chain. Finally, we combine all the above measures into a single index
of supply chain power by extracting the first component from a Principal Component Analysis.
There are significant variations between firms in our sample within a 2-digit SIC industry in
terms of their supply chain power.
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In a univariate analysis, we first find that a greater degree of supply chain power is asso-
ciated with a larger amount of debt, a lower spread, a longer maturity, lower collateral, fewer
covenants, and a higher likelihood of syndication and relationship-based transactions. A high
level of supply chain power appears to be associated with reduced credit risk, leading to more
favorable price and non-price loan-contract terms. Controlling for the level of product-market
competition, various firm, loan, and unobserved industry- and time-invariant attributes, a con-
ditional OLS regression analysis supports these conclusions. To get a sense of the economic
magnitude of our results, based on our OLS estimates, a one-standard-deviation increase in the
supply chain power index measure is associated with a 20.67 basis point reduction in the loan
spread, translating into yearly savings of $0.1958 million for an average sample loan size of
$94.74 million. Assuming that a sample firm has a long-term AAA credit rating, the total com-
pounded debt-service savings accumulate to $1.1278 million for a loan maturing in 5 years.
We measure how the effect of product-market power on the cost of debt changes if we were
to ignore the supplier-side interactions of firms, and document that prior studies on product-
market power and the cost of debt mis-estimate the external debt financing benefit of product
market power. We also show that the negative relationship between power and credit risk
holds irrespective of the type of supply chain, though creditors appear to value arm’s-length
supply chains more favorably than relationship-specific supply chains. Finally, using mediation
analysis, we show that supply chain power reduces inventory-related risk for firms.
Our results are robust to a number of checks. First, to show that our results are not simply
due to supply chain power being a proxy for profitability, we run a number of additional anal-
yses, explicitly controlling for profitability. In every case, we show that supply chain power
remains significant. Next, to show causality and address concerns of endogeneity and omitted
variable bias, we deploy an instrumental variable analysis and analyze a quasi-natural experi-
ment. Both support a causal (negative) interpretation of the relationship between supply chain
power and the overall cost of bank loans. Furthermore, we show that the intuition conveyed by
our main findings extend naturally to traditional measures of bankruptcy risk in the literature
in the sense that supply chain power is negatively associated with the bankruptcy risk of firms.
Finally, we show that our core findings in the OLS framework remain robust to how the firm
sources inputs (the nature of its supply chain - arm’s-length versus relationship-specific) and
to any simultaneity biases between the price and non-price loan-contract terms.
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Overall, our paper adds to the accounting and finance literature in three ways. First, we
provide a comprehensive analysis of how a firm’s economic links with its suppliers affect its
provisions for bank debt financing. The importance of these supply chain relationships, in
particular, has grown significantly in recent times to such an extent that disruptions in supply-
chain linkages can, on average, wipe out 7% of a firm’s equity value (World Economic Forum,
2013). In the presence of significant political events such as Brexit or tariff wars, the potential
for these disruptions increases. Furthermore, the magnitude of the multi-billion dollar supply-
chain disruptions insurance market (Forbes, 2015) appears to imply that supply-chain related
interactions are of paramount importance to industry practitioners.4 While the insurance liter-
ature has been at the forefront of pricing supply-chain related risk (Dong and Tomlin, 2012),
the accounting and finance literature so far has been relatively silent on this issue. Our paper
fills this void by assessing the impact of supply-chain interactions on firm-level credit risk.
Second, we provide a comprehensive analysis on how supply chain power affects a firm’s
debt financing from the perspective of a particular specialized debtholder, a bank. Most prior
literature examines the nexus between supply chain attributes and overall firm financial con-
ditions. For example, Costello (2013) shows that financial covenants can substitute for costly
monitoring in supply contracts and, therefore, can reduce informational and incentive prob-
lems in supply chain relationships. Hui et al. (2012) show that a firm’s bargaining power
relative to its suppliers significantly determines how quickly the firm recognizes losses sug-
gesting that supply chain interactions of a firm influence its accounting practices, specifically,
its accounting conservatism. Hennessey and Livdan (2009) show theoretically that leverage
increases with supplier bargaining power (e.g., unionization rates) and decreases with uti-
lization of non-verifiable inputs (e.g., human capital). Chu (2012) models the relationship
between firm leverage and supplier market structure and argues that firm leverage decreases
with the degree of competition between suppliers. Kale and Shahrur (2007) show that lever-
age is negatively associated with the R&D intensities of the firm’s customers and suppliers.
Banerjee et al. (2008) find that firms in bilateral relationships with suppliers and customers
are likely to have lower debt ratios. Moon and Phillips (2017) show that firms with more
4Supply-chain disruption insurance protects against interruptions in the supply chain. For example, a fire at a sub-supplier’s facility of
Ericsson on March 18, 2000 led to a reduction in the supply of radio-frequency chips. Ericsson’s business interruption costs as a result of this
incident were calculated to be approximately $200 million, which was reimbursed by insurance companies (Norrman and Jansson, 2004).
In a survey of 600 executives, Deloitte Consulting LLP (2013) determined that nearly 75% of the executives identify supply-chain risk to be
extremely or very important in their strategic decision-making.
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outside purchase contracts use less financial leverage and, as a result, have lower risk of fi-
nancial distress. Houston et al. (2016) and Kolay, Lemmon, and Tashjian (2015) show that
the financial distress of a supplier reverberates down the supply chain, ultimately increasing
financing costs of downstream firms. However, banks are more specialized than public debt
markets, in that they provide expert monitoring (Diamond, 1984) and have inside knowledge
of firms’ financial health (Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel, 2006; Campbell and Kracaw, 1980;
Gande and Saunders, 2012). Hence the above results may not be applicable to bank financing.
In our paper, we complement the extant research by providing granular-level evidence, using
comprehensive bank-loan information, that supply chain power favorably affects specific bank
contracting terms. Specifically, Costello (2018) shows that suppliers exposed to a contraction
in bank lending shrink the supply of trade credit offered to their buyers. Our paper comple-
ments this result by showing that firms with supply chain power are offered better terms in
the bank loan market to begin with. Our results also complement those of Patatoukas (2012)
and Krishnan, Patatoukas, and Wang (2018) who show that customer-base concentration has
positive effects on firm performance and negative effects on audit fees, respectively.
Finally, the extant literature typically analyses a firm’s interactions with either its suppli-
ers or customers in isolation. We explicitly take into account the interdependencies between
a firm’s supply-side and demand-side interactions. By highlighting how supply chain power
alleviates the external financing constraints of firms, our findings also have the potential to
shed light on why some firms are financially constrained while others are not.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and main vari-
ables. Section 3 presents a conditional regression analysis followed by various identification
and robustness tests. Section 4 shows how supply chain power affects the relationship between
inventory control efficiency, a factor identified in the prior literature, and the overall cost of
bank loans. Section 5 concludes.
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2. DATA AND VARIABLES
2.1. DATA
To construct our sample, we combine three separate databases. First, we obtain bank loan
information from the DealScan database of the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC), which contains
detailed information on US and foreign commercial loans made to corporations since 1989.
The database was originally constructed from Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) cor-
porate financial filings and through direct research from banks. In our empirical analysis, the
basic unit is a loan, also referred to as a facility or tranche in DealScan. Second, we construct
firm-level supply-chain power measures by collecting information on a firm’s suppliers from the
Compustat customer-segment database. Finally, we merge the DealScan loan-level data and
the firm-level customer-segment data with firm-level financial information from Compustat
annual files.5 Our final sample consists of 10,926 loans over the period 1990-2012.6
Our database contains granular loan-level information about customers representing more
than 10% of sales for each supplier. Clearly, from a supplier’s perspective, such customer-
supplier relationships are economically important. However, the same may not be true from
the customer’s perspective, because suppliers’ sales to the customer may be an insignificant
percentage of the customer’s overall cost of goods sold (COGS). To dispel this concern, we
perform additional analyses to show that such customer-supplier relationships are also eco-
nomically important from customers’ perspectives.7
The distribution of sample loans over the sample periods is shown in panel A of Table 1.
Since firms generally do not initiate loans every year, the number of firms that we observe in
our sample varies over the sample period. Panel B of Table 1 describes various loan types.
Among the sample loans, the three primary types are revolving credit facilities (5,115; 47%),
term loans (2,268; 21%), and 364-day facilities (843; 17%). Panel B also shows various loan
purposes. The primary purposes for our sample loans, as described in DealScan, are: corporate
purposes (42%), debt repayment (14%), working capital financing (12%), and commercial pa-
per backup (12%). Our sample loan features are similar to that of Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders,
5We thank Michael Roberts for providing us with the link file.
6We stop in 2012 because at the time of writing, the link file was only available to this date. We exclude all financial firms from our sample.
7We report these analyses in the online appendix for the sake of brevity.
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and Srinivasan (2011) and Aivazian, Qiu, and Rahaman (2015).
Table 1 is about here
2.2. MAIN VARIABLES
2.2.1. LOAN CONTRACT TERMS
The primary loan-contract term of our analysis is the cost of the loan denoted as SPREADl i j t ,
where l stands for loan, i indexes firm, j indexes industry, and t refers to the loan initiation
year. Much of the literature on the cost of bank debt (e.g., Bharath et al., 2011; Drucker and
Puri, 2005; Graham, Li, and Qiu, 2008) uses the loan spread over LIBOR at the time of the
loan origination as a measure of the cost of bank debt. The “All-in-Drawn” variable in the
DealScan database describes the amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR for
each dollar drawn down. It also adds any annual (or facility) fee paid to the bank group to the
spread of the loan. We use the logarithm of the “All-in-Drawn” variable as the measure of the
cost of bank debt in our analysis. A lower loan spread generally indicates a greater funding
liquidity for firms. Berg, Saunders, and Steffen (2016) propose a new measure for the total
cost of corporate borrowing (TCB) that accounts for fees and the fact that most loans are not
immediately drawn down at origination. We examine whether our results are robust to this
measure of the total cost of borrowing by constructing a similar cost of bank loan measure.
We also examine other loan-contract terms such as loan amount (in millions of dollars), loan
maturity (in months), loan security (indicator variable), and number of loan covenants.
2.2.2. SUPPLY CHAIN POWER (SCP)
Our primary explanatory variable is the power the firm has over the suppliers in its chain.
Following the literature in customer-supplier relationships (Kale and Shahrur, 2007; Banerjee
et al., 2008; Lee, 2010; Williams, 2012; Moon and Phillips, 2017; Campello and Gao, 2017),
we use the Compustat customer-segment data set to construct three separate firm-level mea-
sures of supply chain power (SCP).
First, we use the number of suppliers in a firm’s (denoted as i) supply chain in a given
year (denoted as t). We match Compustat customer-segment data with our sample firms by
company name and year and identify the number of different suppliers a firm has in a given
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year. We then calculate the measure NU MSU PPi t as: Log(1 + number of suppliers). The
measure captures the density of a firm’s supply chain and we argue that a higher density of
suppliers implies a greater power for the firm relative to its suppliers.
Our second measure is the dispersion of suppliers (SDISPERSIONi t) within a firm’s supply
chain. To construct the measure, we first identify the dollar value (in million $) of inputs
sourced by a sample firm from each supplier in a given year. We then define SDISPERSIONi t
as follows:







where SU PPst is the dollar value of inputs sourced by firm i from supplier s in period t,
TOTALSU PPi t is the total dollar value of inputs sourced by firm i in period t, and N is the
number of different suppliers in firm i’s supply chain in period t. This construction is similar
to the inverse of an input-based Herfindahl index and ranges between 0 and 1. A higher value
of SDISPERSIONi t implies that no individual supplier is likely to dominate the firm’s supply
chain and hence increases the power of the firm relative to its suppliers.
Our third measure is an index of market power of a firm over its suppliers (SPOW ERi t)
within its supply chain. To capture the cross-supplier differences in market power, we use the
Lerner index of a supplier (Lerner, 1934), defined as: P−MCP , where P is a supplier’s product
price and MC is the marginal cost of production. The Lerner index directly measures the ability
of a supplier to charge a price above its marginal cost. We follow Gaspar and Massa (2006)
and define the Lerner index as operating profits (before depreciation, interest, special items,
and taxes) over sales using Compustat data items. We then define our SPOW ERi t proxy as
follows:







× LIN DEX st

where SU PPstTOTALSU PPi t is the fraction of input sourced from supplier s by firm i in period t, LIN DEX st
is the Lerner index of supplier s in period t, and N is the total number of suppliers firm i has in
its supply-chain in period t. Since SPOW ERi t ranges between 0 and 1, we use a logarithmic
transform of the measure as: Log(1+ SPOW ERi t). A higher value of the measure implies a
lower ability of the firm’s suppliers to exert market power over the firm. Finally, we aggregate
over all three measures by taking the first principal component from a Principal Component
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Analysis (PCA) to create a composite index of supply chain power of a firm. We find significant
variations across firms and industries in our supply chain power measure.8 We report most of
our analyses using this single index of supply chain power.
2.2.3. PRODUCT-MARKET POWER
To assess the robustness of our analysis relative to the literature on the effect of product-
market power on the cost of debt, we also control for the effects of product-market power on
the cost of bank debt while estimating the effect of supply chain market power on the cost of
debt. Following Valta (2012), we use the fitted Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of Hoberg
and Phillips (2010) to capture a firm’s product-market concentration. In theory, HHI is pos-
itively associated with the pricing power of a firm and hence should lower the firm’s cost of
external debt. As in Valta (2012), we construct an indicator variable based on the HHI index of
Hoberg and Phillips (2010) to classify a firm’s industry into competitive and non-competitive
industries. Specifically, we define an industry as competitive if the fitted HHI is below the
25th percentile of its sample distribution, otherwise it is defined as a non-competitive indus-
try. In addition to the traditional product-market concentration measure, we follow Patatoukas
(2012) in constructing a customer concentration measure from the Compustat customer seg-








, where Salesci t refers to sales to customer c by
supplier i in period t and N is the total number of customers in period t.
2.2.4. FIRM-LEVEL CONTROLS
We use the book value of total assets to control for firm size. Larger firms tend to have longer
histories and be more established. Thus, the informational asymmetry between a large firm
and its lenders is likely to be less severe, resulting in more favorable contract terms. Tobin’s q,
constructed following Duchin (2010), is used as a proxy for the firm’s growth opportunities. It
is plausible that growth firms may be more vulnerable to financial distress and to informational
asymmetries. In our context, since we control for characteristics such as tangibility of book
assets, growth opportunities may instead lower loan costs since they represent an additional
value over book assets that debtholders can access in the event of default. Leverage, the ratio
of the long-term debt to total assets, is used to control for the firm’s existing debt level. Firms
8We report the sample distribution of the SCP measure and the list of firms that are in the top 1% and the bottom 1% of the sample
distribution of the SC P measure in the online appendix.
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with higher leverage ratios have, on average, higher default risk and are thus expected to have
higher borrowing costs. We also include Profitability, defined as the ratio of EBIT to total assets,
because default risk is lower for profitable firms, lowering borrowing costs. Asset tangibility,
defined as the ratio of net plant, property, and equipment (PP&E) to total assets, is included to
control for the easier recoverability of tangible assets in the case of default. Finally, following
Bharath and Shumway (2008), Current ratio, Interest coverage ratio, and the Expected default
frequency, are included to further control for default risk and the extent of external financial
constraints. A higher value of Interest coverage ratio indicates better financial health and lower
default risk of debt. According to Whited (1992), Hu and Schiantarelli (1998), and Guariglia
(2008), firms with higher interest coverage ratios have better access to external finance. A
higher value of Expected default frequency indicates worse financial health and higher default
risk of debt. We winsorize all firm-level variables at the 1% level.
2.2.5. LOAN-LEVEL CONTROLS
Finally, we control for loan characteristics that are related to the price of debt. We use the
facility amount (in $ millions) to control for loan size. Loan size may reflect economies of scale
in bank lending and is expected to be inversely related to the loan rate (see Berger and Udell,
1992). We use the maturity (in months) of the loan to control for liquidity. Longer-term debt
tends to be charged a higher loan rate because of its lower liquidity. We control for the collateral
structure of a loan by incorporating a dummy variable, collateral, indicating whether a loan is
secured.9 We use a Big 3 lender dummy variable to control for whether the loan is syndicated
by any of the three largest US banks (Aivazian et al., 2015). Bharath et al. (2011) show that
around 70% of all syndicated loans are relationship-based, making this a systemic feature of
the syndicated loan market. Therefore, we also control for whether a loan is relationship-based
or arm’s length. Following Bharath et al. (2011), we classify a loan as relationship-based if the
issuing firm had a prior lending relationship with the lead bank in the syndicate within the five
years to the current loan initiation year. We also include dummy variables for loan type and
loan purpose. As shown in Table 1, loans are of different types, such as 364-day loans, term
loans, and revolving loans, and are used for different purposes, such as for debt repayments,
takeovers, and working-capital financing. They are usually associated with different risks, and
9In the DealScan data set, security features are missing for some loans. In such cases, we assume that the loan is not secured.
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tend to be priced differently.
2.3. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 1 documents differences in the time-series of loan issuance patterns as well as the
differences in loan types and purposes between high and low SC P firms. We define a firm as
having high supply-chain power if the firm-level SC P measure is above the 75th percentile of
its sample distribution. Similarly, a firm is defined as having low power in its supply chain if
the firm-level SC P measure is below the 25th percentile of its sample distribution.
The table shows that high-SC P firms are more likely to utilize short-term 364-day facilities
while low-SC P firms are more likely to use revolving credit maturing in more than a year.
Under the Basel II international banking standards, if a loan facility met the 364-day facility
criteria, then the undrawn portion of the facility at any time was treated as being off-balance
sheet and was accorded a credit conversion factor of 0% to 20%. Banks, therefore, typically
deem issuers of 364-day facilities (high-SC P firms) less risky and typically offer more attractive
undrawn fees (commitment and annual fees) on 364-day facilities than on multi-year revolvers.
Similarly, the table shows that high-SC P firms are twice as likely to use loan facilities for
commercial paper back-up while low-SC P firms are twice as likely to use loan facilities for
working capital management purposes. It is widely recognized that companies with less liquid
assets and high sales seasonality rely on working capital loans to help with periods of reduced
business activity. In contrast, companies with better credit ratings can issue commercial paper,
while a backup line of credit effectively provides an alternative source of liquidity for the issuer.
Given that the loan spread reflects not only a default premium determined by the firm’s credit
risk but also a liquidity premium (e.g., Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis, 2005; Chen, Lesmond, and
Wei, 2007; He and Xiong, 2012; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009), these differences in loan
characteristics suggest that rollover risk and liquidity premia of high-SC P firms are likely to be
lower than for low-SC P firms.
Table 2 shows various price and non-price loan contract terms and examines the uncondi-
tional mean difference between high- and low-SC P firms. To capture the difference between
high- and low-SC P firms, we define HM L as: HSC P − LSC P. Panel A of Table 2 shows that
high-SC P firms obtain an unconditional loan spread that is 63.67 basis points lower than low-
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SCP firms. Furthermore, high-SC P firms also pay lower amounts of various fees associated
with a loan contract and, as a result, their total cost of borrowing is, on average, 34.41 basis
points lower than low-SC P firms. Panel B of the table shows unconditional mean differences
in various non-price loan contract terms between high- and low-SC P firms. High-SC P firms,
on average, raise greater amounts in loan financing, though with shorter loan maturities. They
use less collateral, have fewer loan covenants, and have a higher likelihood of loan syndica-
tion. Moreover, loans to high-SC P firms are more likely to be relationship-based than arm’s
length. These descriptive statistics suggest that creditors explicitly take into account the costs
and benefits arising from supply-chain power in the pricing and designing of loan contracts.
Supply chain power appears to be negatively related to firm credit risk, and is manifested in
more favorable price and non-price loan-contract terms.
Tables 2 and 3 are about here
Table 3 provides granular-level characterization of loan covenants and collateral structure
for our sample firms and loans.10 Demiroglu and James (2010) show that loan covenants con-
vey information concerning future changes in investment and financial policies of firms. Li, Vas-
vari, and Moerman (2016) argue that progressive tightness of (earning-based) covenants over
time can be used as a signal by underperforming borrowers expecting future performance im-
provements. Beatty, Ramesh, and Weber (2002) find that borrowers are willing to pay substan-
tially higher interest rates to retain accounting flexibility that may help them avoid covenant
violations. Using a new measure of aggregate probability of covenant violation, Demerjian and
Owens (2016) emphasize the importance of inclusion of accounting-based financial covenants
in debt contracting.
Consistent with these studies, the summary statistics presented in the table suggest that
creditors afford greater flexibility to high-SC P firms in terms of how they use their operating,
investment, and financing cash flows compared to low-SCP firms, i.e., less stringent general
covenants. Additionally, high-SC P firms enjoy less stringent leverage restrictions (maximum
debt/equity financial covenant) than low-SC P firms. However, the flexibility in cash-flow us-
10Loan covenants in DealScan are generally classified into three categories, i.e., general, net worth, and financial covenants. The set of
general covenants describes whether the borrower is restricted from paying dividends to its shareholders, the percentage of excess cash-flow
and net income the borrower is allowed to use towards dividends, and the fraction of net proceeds a borrower receives from a financial activity
that must be used to reduce any outstanding loan balance (the sweep covenants). The net worth covenant determines the percentage cut-off
of net worth that should be compared to the borrower’s net income. Finally, financial covenants specify the maximum and minimum levels
of various financial ratios for a borrower to be in good standing with creditors.
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age and debt capacity of high-SC P firms comes with more restrictive EBITDA and debt service-
related financial covenants for these firms. The table also shows that high-SC P firms are likely
to use a greater variety of assets as collateral for loans than low-SC P firms. Overall, the positive
association between supply chain power and loan-covenants-induced cash-flow flexibility and
debt capacity in our sample firms suggests that free cash-flow driven agency problems (Jensen,
1986) may be less of a concern for creditors when evaluating the credit risk of a high-SC P firm
compared to a low-SC P firm.11
Finally, Table 4 provides summary statistics for various firm characteristics, the supply chain
power measure and its various components, and the product-market power measures. It shows
that there are systematic differences in various firm characteristics between low- and high-SC P
firms. In particular, in panel C of the table, it is evident that supply chain power appears to be
positively associated with product-market power. As noted above, these differential firm char-
acteristics suggest that unconditional statistics regarding the price and non-price loan contract
terms presented in Tables 2 and 3 may not be sufficient to draw robust conclusions on how
supply-chain power affects firms’ credit risk unless various firm-specific attributes are also con-
trolled for.
Table 4 is about here
3. REGRESSION ANALYSIS
3.1. BASELINE ANALYSIS
The univariate analysis so far suggests that the firm’s supply-chain power is associated with
lower loan spreads and less restrictive non-price loan contract terms. In the remaining sections
of the paper, we examine whether this relationship remains robust to conditioning on a set of
baseline covariates as well as to potential endogeneity of the firm’s supply chain power. We
begin by estimating the following baseline OLS regression model:
LSPREADl i j t = α+ β .SC Pi j t + X
′
i j t .δ+ Z
′
l i j t .γ+µ j + νt + εl i j t , (1)
11This is also consistent with Demerjian (2017) who shows that the intensity of covenant use by creditors is positively associated with the
extent of informational uncertainty concerning a borrower’s future cash flows.
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where LSPREADl i j t is the logarithm of loan spread over LIBOR for loan l initiated by firm i
at time t operating in industry j.12 SC Pi j t is the firm-level supply-chain power measure. X i j t
and Zl i j t control for various firm- and loan-specific attributes, respectively. Finally, µ j, νt , and
εl i j t are defined as industry fixed effects, year fixed effects, and a noise term, respectively.
The main empirical test in this regression setting is whether, all else equal, a high-SC P firm
faces systematically different costs to a low-SC P firm when initiating a bank loan. In regression
model (1), the β captures the effect of supply-chain power on the cost of bank loans conditional
on various firm- and loan-specific attributes.
Panel A of Table 5 reports the baseline regression results from equation (1) without con-
trolling for firm- and loan-specific attributes. Across all specifications and components of the
aggregate supply-chain power measure, the results show a significantly (at the 1% level) neg-
ative association between a firm’s supply chain power and its cost of bank loans. Since the
dependent variable in regression model (1) is in logarithmic form, the regression coefficient β
can be interpreted as semi-elasticity of supply-chain power on the cost of bank loans as follows:
∂ SPREAD
∂ SC P ×
1
SPREAD , where SPREAD is the dependent variable (in levels) (in our case, the level
of the All-in-Drawn variable). Following this logic, the β coefficient in column (1) of Table 5
can be construed as ∆SPREAD = −0.091× SPREADini t ial ×∆SC P. If we evaluate this at the
observed loan spread of the average firm in our sample (equivalent to 184.73 basis points in Ta-
ble 2), a one-standard-deviation (equivalent to 0.9901) increase in the in-sample supply-chain
power measure is associated with a 16.64 basis point reduction in loan spread. Compared to
the average facility amount of $94.74 million for the high-SC P firm sample, the 16.64 basis
point reduction in loan spread is equivalent to $0.1576 million in annual debt-service savings
for these firms. In panel B of the table, we report our baseline regression results controlling for
product-market power.13 The results show that consistent with prior literature, product-market
power is associated with lower cost of debt. More importantly, after controlling for product-
market power, the negative effect of supply chain on the cost of debt remains statistically and
economically significant.
One concern with our specification is that supply chain power is simply a proxy for firm
profitability. If so, once controlled for in the regression specification, profitability should soak
12An industry is identified by the six-digit NAICS industry code within which a firm operates.
13We report results only for the HHI measure of product-market power. Results using other measures are available in the Online Appendix.
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up all (or most) of the explained variations attributable to supply chain power. While we ex-
plicitly control for firm profitability in our subsequent tables, to further alleviate this concern
for the unconditional results in this table, we reproduce the results in Table 5 using 11 different
specifications to examine whether the reported results in the table remain robust to controlling
for firm profitability in a variety of models. These profitability robustness analyses are reported
in the online appendix. These results show that supply chain power is not equivalent to prof-
itability and our measure of supply chain power captures information content that is different
from the profit potential of the firm.14
Table 5 is about here
Table 6 reports the baseline regression results from equation (1) after controlling for firm-
and loan-specific attributes. For specifications 1-3, the dependent variable is the logarithm
of loan spread (Log(All-in-Drawn)) and for specifications 4-6, the dependent variable is the
logarithm of the total cost of borrowing (Log(TCB)). For both dependent variables, we present
results using the primary PCA index of supply chain power for the sake of brevity. For each
dependent variable, we first report results controlling for firm and loan characteristics, followed
by results controlling for product-market power.
The results show that, across all specifications, supply-chain power has a significantly neg-
ative (at the 1% level) impact on the cost of bank loans. Following the logic mentioned earlier,
for the β coefficient in regression model (1), the effect of supply chain power on the cost of
bank loans in column (1) of Table 6 can be interpreted as∆SPREAD = −0.113×SPREADini t ial×
∆SC P. As above, if we evaluate this at the observed loan spread of the average firm in our
sample, a one-standard-deviation increase in the in-sample supply-chain power measure is as-
sociated with a 20.67 basis point reduction in loan spread. Compared to the average facility
amount for the high-SC P firm sample, the 20.67 basis point reduction in loan spread is equiva-
lent to $0.1958 million in annual debt-service savings for these firms. Assuming that a low-SC P
firm has a AAA credit rating with 7.08% long-term average yield,15 the total compounded debt-









loan maturing in 5 years.16 Firm size, growth opportunities (measured by Tobin’s q), asset tan-
14We apply a similar profitability robustness analysis to our subsequent estimates in both our subsequent multivariate regressions and our
path analysis, but all our reported results remain robust to these alternative specifications.
15See “https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/AAA” for Moody’s Seasoned AAA Corporate Bond Yield.
16The median low-SC P firm in our sample has a loan maturity of approximately 5 years in Table 2.
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gibility, interest-coverage ratio, facility size and maturity, reputation of the lead lender (big 3
lender dummy), and prior lending relationship are, on average, negatively associated with the
cost of bank loans. In contrast, leverage, default risk (EDF), and loan security are positively
associated with the cost of bank debt. The signs and significance of these controls are similar
to those reported in prior literature (Aivazian et al., 2015; Bharath et al., 2011; Graham et al.,
2008). The statistical and economic significance of supply chain power conveyed by the above
results remain robust to controlling for loan characteristics as well as product-market power.
Table 6 is about here
3.2. BASELINE ANALYSIS: ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF SCP
As a robustness to our baseline analysis, we introduce additional measures of supply chain
power that take into account the relative size of the two parties.17 First, we construct a supply-
chain COGS concentration index to quantify the importance of supply-chain COGS sourcing
to customers. We first identify the dollar value (in million $) of COGS sourced by customer







, where COGSsi t is the dollar value of COGS sourced by customer i from sup-
plier s in period t, COGSi t is the total dollar value of COGS of customer i in period t, and N is
the number of different suppliers in customer i’s supply chain in period t. This construction is
similar to a COGS-based Herfindahl-Hirschman index and ranges between 0 and 1. A higher
value of the concentration index implies that the bulk of the COGS of a customer is attributed to
a few suppliers in the supply chain, making the customer more susceptible to supply-chain re-
lated disruptions, thereby lessening the power of the customer over its supply chain. We expect




across all suppliers in customer i’s supply chain in period t to measure the impor-
tance of supply-chain COGS sourcing to a customer. A higher value of the measure implies
a greater degree of dependence of the customer on its supply chain for COGS sourcing. We
expect the supply chain dependence of a customer to favorably affect its cost of bank financing.
Third, we divide the number of relationship-based suppliers of customer i in period t by its
total number of suppliers in period t to capture the specialized nature of a customer-supplier
17We thank the referee for this suggestion.
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relationship; a supplier is defined as a relationship-based supplier if a customer sources part
of its COGS from the supplier more than once over the prior three years. Finally, we use the
fraction of COGS from relationship-based suppliers over the total COGS of customer i in pe-
riod t to capture the importance of specialized inputs in the customer-supplier relationship. A
relationship-based supply chain implies greater operational stability of a customer’s production
process and, hence, we expect lenders to favourably incorporate such supply chain attributes
in the credit risk assessment of a firm.
Table 7 is about here
Table 7 reports the OLS estimates of the effects on these additional measures of supply
chain power on the cost of bank debt. The results show that when a customer relies on a
few concentrated suppliers for its COGS sourcing, thereby lessening its supply chain power,
the cost of bank debt increases. In contrast, reliance on distributed supply-chain sourcing,
relationship-based suppliers, and relationship-based supply-chain COGS sourcing reduces the
cost of bank debt. Our results with alternative measures of supply chain power remain robust
after controlling for product market competition.18
3.3. Demand and supply side market power and the cost of debt
While it is important to consider both supply-side and demand-side interactions for a fuller
understanding of the effects of market power on the cost of debt, most existing studies, in-
cluding Valta (2012) and Xu (2012), examine the effects of product-market competition in
isolation. In this section, we examine how the effect of product-market competition on the
cost of debt changes if one ignores the supply-side interactions of firms. We begin with the
following model from Valta (2012) without considering the supply-side power of firms:
Y = X .β +µ (2)
where Y is the cost of debt, X is the level of product-market competition, including other
control variables, and µ is the standard white noise term. In model (2), the β coefficient
captures the effect of product-market competition on the cost of external debt financing (we
18Furthermore, to assuage the concern that for a very large customer, with relatively more suppliers, the SCP may proxy for a nonlinear
size effect on the cost of debt, we estimate polynomial (up to degree 10) regressions and find that the beneficial effects of SCP remain robust
after controlling for various firm size polynomials. We report these polynomial regressions in the appendix for brevity.
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ignore the effects of other controls here for the sake of simplicity). Now if we condition model
(2) on a firm’s supply-side market power, we can rewrite model (2) as follows:
YH = XH .βH +µH if the firm has high supply-side power (3)
YL = X L.βL +µL if the firm has low supply-side power
We define SPH as an indicator variable set to 1 if a firm has high supply-side market power and
0 otherwise. Similarly, we define SPL as an indicator variable set to 1 if a sample firm has low
supply-side market power. We can now combine the two equations in model (3) and rewrite










We can also rewrite the above model in the following manner:





where µ∗ = SPH .µH +SPL.µL. In the specification (5) above βL −βH captures the difference in
the effect of product-market power on the cost of debt financing conditional on low versus high
supply-side market power. We estimate specification (5) using our data and test the difference
parameter βL − βH using a Wald test statistic, i.e., an F test.
Table 8 is about here
Table 8 reports our estimation from model (5). Column (1) of Table 8 shows the effect
of product-market competition on the cost of bank loans depending on whether a firm has
high or low supply-chain power in its supply-side interactions.19 The results show that for
high-SC P firms, product-market competition significantly reduces cost of bank loans at the 1%
level of significance, captured by the βH coefficient. In addition, the external debt financing
benefit of product-market competition is much more pronounced for firms with high supply
chain power compared to the average firm in our sample, i.e., the value of |βH | is more than
twice as large as the coefficient on |HHI | (0.885) in column (3), Table 6. In other words,
empirical studies, such as Valta (2012), which examine the external debt financing effects of
product-market competition are likely to underestimate the benefits for firms that also enjoy
19We use the sample median of a variable as the cutoff point to differentiate between high and low levels of that variable.
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high market power in their upstream (supply-side) operations. Further, the results in column
(1) also show that βL − βH > 0, suggesting that the effects of product-market power on the
cost of bank loans differ systematically and significantly (at the 1% level) between low- and
high-SC P firms. This suggests that prior studies are also likely to overestimate the external debt
financing benefit of product-market competition, captured by the coefficient -0.885 in column
(3) of Table 6, for firms with low supply chain market power. In sum, the results in column
(1) of Table 8 imply that unconditional (with respect to supply-side) estimates of the effects
of product-market competition on the cost of debt are likely to be biased in either direction,
depending on the degree as well as the extent of a firm’s market power in its supply chain.
Column (2) of the table presents results for the customer concentration measure of Patatoukas
(2012), and indicate that a greater customer concentration (less product-market competition)
is associated with relatively lower loan costs for low-SC P than for high-SC P firms.
We note that a similar criticism also applies to studies that examine the effect of supply-
side power in isolation. However, the results in column (3) of Table 8 show that the likely
bias in the estimate of the effect of SC P on the cost of bank loans, when ignoring product-
market competition, is much smaller than the equivalent bias in product-market competition.
For instance, the unconditional (with respect to product-market competition) effect of SC P
in column (2) of Table 6, i.e., β = −0.045, is virtually the same as the conditional effect
(conditional on high product-market competition) in column (3) of Table 8, i.e., βH = −0.048.
Furthermore, βL − βH > 0 in column (3) of the table, suggesting that when a firm has low
upstream market power, the external debt financing benefit of product-market competition
becomes much more pronounced. We also perform similar exercises for the supply-chain power
and customer concentration and the results in columns (2) and (4) suggest that the debt benefit
of customer concentration is more pronounced for low-SC P firms. However, when a firm has
high customer-base concentration, the debt benefit of supply chain power also increases.
3.4. INFERRING CAUSALITY I: AN INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES (IV) ANALYSIS
A potential identification issue with the OLS estimation is the endogeneity of supply-chain
power. It is plausible, for example, that firms that are more likely to benefit from supply-chain
power are also firms that rely heavily on specific types of production processes that enhance
their power. In other words, there could be additional unmeasured effects that affect both the
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firm’s degree of power to control its supply chain and its cost of bank loans, thereby leading
to an omitted variable bias. A common way to deal with the endogeneity problem is by using
an Instrumental Variables (IV) approach. Under this approach, we need to find an instrument
that is correlated with supply-chain power, but is unrelated to the cost of bank loans and the
error in the regression.
We instrument the firm’s supply-chain power with a measure that captures the geographical
dispersion (based on the longitude and latitude of a supplier’s ZIP code) among its suppliers.
We argue that geographical dispersion among suppliers within a firm’s supply chain increases
co-ordination problems among its suppliers and, as a result, the firm is less likely to experience a
supplier “hold-up” problem during the course of production, significantly reducing its business
risk. This, in turn, can engender a greater incentive for the firm to rely on a geographically
dispersed supply chain. Although suppliers’ locations do not directly affect the information
set of banks, it is possible that suppliers’ locations may change over time. If the decision of a
supplier to relocate is not orthogonal to the bank’s information set, the geographical dispersion
among suppliers may not be excludable from the bank-loan spread regression analysis. To
address this concern, we manually check the 10-K filings of our sample suppliers and identify
those that changed their business addresses during our sample period. We then exclude all
those supply chains from our IV analysis if they contain any supplier that relocated.20
To construct the instrument for firm i in period t, we first calculate the mean absolute













∀ k 6= l,
where MADDi t is the mean absolute deviation of the geographical distances among all sup-
pliers within firm i’s supply chain in period t.21 DIST k,li t is the geographical distance between
suppliers k and l in firm i’s supply chain in period t, DIST k,li t is the average geographical dis-
tance among all suppliers within firm i’s supply chain in period t, and Ni t is the total number of
suppliers in firm i’s supply chain in period t.22 For instance, if a firm has 5 different suppliers in
20We thank the referee for this suggestion.
21We use the mean absolute deviation instead of standard deviation because the standard deviation is undefined for a firm with a single
supplier in a given year.
22We do not include the distance between firm i and any of its suppliers in our MADDi t measure. Instead, the measure is calculated based
solely on distances among suppliers of firm i.
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2×1 = 10. We then use the logarithmic transformation of the measure,
i.e., Log(1+ MADDi t), as our instrument for supply chain power.23
Table 9 is about here
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 9 report our IV regressions only for those customers that did
not have any of the relocating suppliers in their supply chains. As suggested by Larcker and
Rusticus (2010), we report the first-stage results along with necessary tests for all IV estima-
tions. In the first stage, the instrument is significantly positively correlated, as desired, with our
supply chain power measure with high t-statistics and F-statistics. In the second stage, supply
chain power is significantly related to loan spread and the negative relationship is significant at
the 1% level. The signs and statistical significance of all the firm-specific and loan-specific char-
acteristics are similar to the OLS regression except for the magnitudes of those effects. To test
for the existence of endogeneity, we use the Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978). The
Hausman test is based on the difference between the OLS estimator (which is consistent and
efficient under the null hypothesis of no endogeneity, but inconsistent under the alternative)
and the IV estimator (which is consistent under both, but inefficient under the null). We can
reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity at the 1% level of significance, suggesting that the
IV specification is more efficient than the simple OLS specification. Simply put, supply chain
power lowers the cost of bank loans and this effect is robust to possible endogeneity concerns.
One thing to note is that the coefficient on our supply chain power measure becomes signifi-
cantly more negative in our instrumental variable estimation. The stronger negative coefficient,
after controlling for endogeneity, can be explained by the correlation of a firm’s supply chain
power with its performance. As can be seen from Table 4, firms that exert a great deal of power
over their supply chains tend to be less profitable. Thus, not controlling for omitted (negative)
performance attributes might lead the coefficient of supply chain power to partially capture
the positive effect of poor profitability on the cost of debt and bias the OLS estimate toward
zero. After controlling for the endogeneity of supply chain power due to omitted variables, the
negative effect of supply chain power on loan costs is likely to be more pronounced.24
23Since the distance measure ranges over several orders of magnitude in some cases, the logarithm minimizes the impact of outliers.
24For robustness, we also test two variations of our instrument. First, we use the difference between the geographical distances of the 75th
and the 25th percentile suppliers in the distribution of distances among all suppliers of a firm in a given year, i.e., the inter-quartile distance.
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However, one could also argue that the loan spread decision and the choice of a firm’s supply
chain (and by implication, the dispersion among a firm’s suppliers) may be co-determined,
potentially polluting our instrument. To alleviate any such concern, we introduce an alternative
instrument. To construct the new instrument for each customer i in period t, we collect all
nonzero amounts of minority interest in the suppliers’ balance sheets. A nonzero minority
interest indicates that, at some point in time, the supplier firm may be acquired by another firm
resulting in disruptions in the supply chain of customer i. A supply chain prone to disruption is
likely to lessen the supply chain power of a customer. Since minority interest is determined by
past acquisition activities related to suppliers, it is unlikely to be contemporaneously correlated
with the loan spread of the customer. We use the average minority interest across all suppliers
of customer i in period t as our instrument for customer i’s supply chain power. Columns (3)
and (4) of Table 9 reports our IV analysis using the alternative instrument. The results show
that the average supply chain minority interest is indeed negatively and significantly associated
with supply chain power in the first stage and instruments satisfies the exclusion restriction
test. More importantly, our results establishes a casual link between supply chain power and
the cost of bank debt by showing that the instrumented supply chain power significantly (at
the 1% level) reduces the loan spread for our sample of firms.25
3.4.1. SIMULTANEITY OF PRICE AND NON-PRICE CONTRACT TERMS
Our results so far suggest that supply-chain power reduces the cost of bank loans. However,
besides the costs of the loan, non-price debt contract terms can also impose indirect costs on
borrowing firms. For example, firms may incur higher transaction costs if they are forced to
refinance more frequently, managers may spend more time dealing with more frequent debt
issues, and firms may forgo profitable investment opportunities as a result of additional debt
covenant restrictions. Barclay and Smith (1995) show that short-term bank loans help enhance
monitoring. For example, by reducing the debt term, a bank can maintain a stronger bargaining
position. Banks can also periodically evaluate the firm’s ability to pay off debt through a short-
term debt-renewal process. Jensen and Meckling (1976), Smith and Warner (1979), Aivazian
and Callen (1980) and others argue that firms with greater agency problems benefit from more
Second, we compute the standard deviation of distances between the firm and its suppliers. Since the results are qualitatively similar in both
cases, we do not report them for brevity.
25We also examine the robustness of our single equation IV results by simultaneously incorporating endogeneity of product-market compe-
tition and the results are reported in the online appendix.
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collateral and restrictive covenants on their debt to reduce moral hazard problems. Although
it is difficult to quantify such costs, testing for the effect of supply-chain power on the cost of
bank loans could be confounded by the interdependencies between price and non-price terms
of credit. From an estimation point of view, complications may also arise due to the joint
determination of price and some non-price debt-contract terms. To understand how supply-
chain power affects the overall cost of bank loans via non-price terms, following Bharath et
al. (2011), we focus on the maturity and collateral terms of the contract and estimate the
following simultaneous equation model:
LSPREADl i j t = α1 + β1.SC Pi j t +π1.COLLAT ERALi j t +ψ1.MAT URI T Yi j t
+X ′i j t .δ1 + Z
′
l i j t .γ1 +µ j + νt + εl i j t
MAT URI T Yl i j t = α2 + β2.SC Pi j t +π2.COLLAT ERALi j t
+X ′i j t .δ2 + Z
′
l i j t .γ2 +µ j + νt + εl i j t
COLLAT ERALl i j t = α3 + β3.SC Pi j t +ψ3.MAT URI T Yi j t
+X ′i j t .δ3 + Z
′
l i j t .γ3 +µ j + νt + εl i j t , (6)
where MAT URI T Yi j t is the maturity (in months) of a loan; and COLLAT ERALi j t is a dummy
variable indicating whether the loan is collateralized. We assume, following Bharath et al.
(2011), that maturity and collateral affect each other (bidirectional relationship) while spread
is only affected by maturity and collateral (unidirectional relationship). The loan spread vari-
able is not included in any of our regressions of non-price terms because the typical process
of syndication suggests that the loan price is determined after all other non-price terms have
been settled.26
A complication arises in estimating the above system because spread and maturity are con-
tinuous variables, while security is a dichotomous variable. To address this issue, we follow
Wooldridge (2002), who shows that estimating a Logit model in the first stage and using the
fitted value as an instrument for the dichotomous variable in the second stage results in a
consistent estimate. For the two endogeneous variables in the spread equation, maturity and
26S&P’s (2011) “A Guide to the Loan Market” describes the process of loan issuance in several discrete steps. The process starts with
the borrower appointing the lead bank, which conducts due diligence and negotiates the non-price loan features such as amount, collateral,
maturity, and covenants with the borrower and leaves the final price to be determined. The lead bank then informally polls potential syndicate
members to gauge the level of interest in the loan and uses the information to set the interest rate on the loan. Finally, it is launched for
syndication.
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collateral, we use two different instruments. Hart and Moore (1994) argue that firms at-
tempt to match their debt maturity to the maturity of their real assets. Barclay and Smith
(1995) use asset maturity and a regulated industry dummy as instruments for debt matu-














, where CA is current assets; PPE is net PP&E, COGS is the cost
of goods sold, and D&A is depreciation and amortization. We use this proxy for the firm’s asset
maturity as an instrument for its loan maturity. To instrument for collateral, we use a measure
of loan concentration following Berger and Udell (1990) as: Loan AmountExisting Debt + Loan Amount.
Table 10 is about here
Table 10 reports the results from the simultaneous regression model (6). Note that there is
no simultaneity issue for the spread equation since the loan spread does not enter the maturity
and collateral equations as an explanatory variable. Thus, a simple OLS estimation suffices
for the loan spread equation. Column (1) of Table 10 reports the OLS estimates of the spread
equation, which is the same as the results in column (2) of Table 6. Columns (2) and (3) of
Table 10 report the results where maturity and collateral are replaced with the fitted values of
the first-stage regressions from the instrumental variables estimations of maturity and collateral
equations. Both columns show that, similar to the OLS results, supply-chain power reduces the
cost of bank loans, even after controlling for product-market competition (in column 3). To
get a sense of the economic significance of this result, when supply-chain power increases from
low (5th percentile) to high (95th) in column 2, the cost of bank loans declines by 12.03 basis
points for the average sample firm with an average loan spread of 184.73 basis points. Columns
(4) to (6) report the results for the maturity equation. In particular, the instrumental variables
regression results in columns (5) and (6) show that supply-chain power has a positive effect on
loan maturity, conditional on other firm- and loan-specific attributes. As noted earlier, a shorter
loan maturity may imply more frequent refinancing and thus higher transaction costs for firms.
Finally, columns (7) to (9) report the results for the collateral equation. Across all the models,
we cannot reject the hypothesis that the loan cost is disproportionately higher for firms with
relatively lower supply-chain power than firms with relatively higher supply-chain power, even
after addressing the interdependencies between price and non-price contract terms of a debt
contract.
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3.5. INFERRING CAUSALITY II: A QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH
Atanasov and Black (2016) argue that shock-based research designs form a stronger basis
for credible causal inference. Hence, to complement our IV analysis, in this section, we use two
exogenous (negative) shocks to firms’ demand for and supply of financing as quasi-experiments
to isolate the direction of causality from supply-chain power to the cost of bank loans. Con-
ventional wisdom suggests that external financing constraints of firms normally become tighter
during periods of economic disruption. However, the supply chain power of firms can alleviate
such (exogenously imposed) credit constraints by providing supply-chain-powerful firms the
option of accessing supply-chain-related financing (such as trade credit) and bypassing the ex-
ternal capital market during periods of heightened capital-market frictions (PWC, 2014; Yang
and Birge, 2017). Since an exogenous (unanticipated) shock is unrelated to unobservables af-
fecting both the supply chain power and the loan spread by design, such transitory shocks are
likely to generate purely exogenous variations in cross-sectional loan spread and supply chain
power. For instance, the conditional effect of supply chain power on loan spread (β) in equa-
tion (1) can be expressed as: E
 
Y | SC P, X

Z=0 = β , where Y is the logarithm of loan spread,
SC P denotes supply chain power, X is the set of baseline covariates, and Z = 0 implies a no-
shock regime. When an exogenous shock alters the correlation structure among variables, the
conditional effect will change to: E
 
Y | SC P, X

Z=1 = β
′, where Z = 1 implies a shock regime.
As long as the shock is unrelated to unobservables affecting both the loan spread and the supply
chain power, the change in the conditional effect of supply chain power on the loan spread be-
tween the shock and no-shock regimes, i.e.,∆= E
 








must be driven primarily by the cross-sectional variations in supply-chain power. To opera-
tionalize this idea, we augment our baseline OLS regression model as follows:
LSPREADl i j t = α+ β .SC Pi j t + θ .SHOCKi j t +λ.

SC Pi j t × SHOCKi j t

(7)
+X ′i j t .δ+ Z
′
l i j t .γ+µ j + νt + εl i j t ,
where SHOCKi j t is the dichotomous exogenous shock to firms’ credit risk and the interaction
term λ captures the differential effect of supply chain power on the cost of bank loans during
periods of heightened capital-market frictions. To empirically estimate the regression model
(7), we use two different economic shock measures.
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The first measure, from Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016), captures the aggregate economic
and policy-related uncertainty that is beyond an individual firm’s control but affects all firms.
The measure is an equally weighted index of the following series: monthly news articles
containing terms such as “uncertain” or “uncertainty”, “economic” or “economy”, and policy-
relevant terms such “policy”, “tax”, “spending”, “regulation”, “federal reserve”, “budget”, and
“deficit”(scaled by the smoothed number of articles containing ‘today’); the number of tax laws
expiring in coming years; and a composite of interquartile ranges for quarterly forecasts of fed-
eral government expenditures and 1-year Consumer Price Index (CPI) from the Philadelphia
Fed Survey of Forecasters. A higher value of the index implies a greater degree of economic
and policy-related uncertainty.27 Based on the uncertainty index, we construct our dichoto-
mous variable U IN DEX that returns 1 if the uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2016) is above
the sample median, and 0 otherwise.
The second measure is an exogenous liquidity shock specific to loan supply to firms in our
sample. It is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the lead bank in a given loan contract
initiated between 2001 and 2003 is a subsidiary of a Japanese parent bank. KPMG (2011)
notes that real estate loan balances in Japanese banks’ portfolios declined “from 1999 through
2003 when Japanese companies implemented balance sheet restructuring after the conclusion
of the bubble era (which came to an abrupt end in the early 1990s)”.28 Peek and Rosengren
(2000) and Benmelech, Bergman, and Seru (2015) show that the collapse of the real estate
market in Japan adversely affected the lending of Japanese banks and their subsidiaries in the
real-estate and industrial sectors in the US.
Table 11 is about here
Table 11 shows results from the augmented OLS regression model. For each shock measure,
the table first shows the effects of supply chain power on the cost of bank loans during high-
and low-uncertainty periods and then shows the differential effects by combining both high-
and low-uncertainty samples. The table shows that the beneficial effect of supply chain power
on the cost of bank loans is more pronounced during high-uncertainty periods than in low-
27For robustness, we use two other uncertainty measures. The first is from Alexopolous and Cohen (2009). They use the log of the total
number of articles appearing each month in the New York Times that contain references to uncertainty and the economy as their index of
uncertainty. The second is the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options from the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index
(V IX ). Our results remain quantitatively and qualitatively similar using these alternative measures of uncertainty.
28We also use the loan share of the Japanese lead bank during this period as an alternative measure of loan-level supply shock.
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uncertainty periods. Our results are even stronger in terms of economic significance when
we focus on the loan-level liquidity supply shock. These results suggest that the supply chain
power becomes particularly valuable for firms, from a credit-risk perspective, during periods of
elevated capital-market frictions. Finally, columns (4)-(6) of Table 11 show the the beneficial
effects of supply chain power during uncertain economic times remain intact when controlling
for product-market power as well.
3.6. INFERRING CAUSALITY III: HOLD-UP RISK AND LOAN SPREAD
To address the concern that our cross-sectional regression setting (without firm-fixed ef-
fects) may pick up the opposite channel, i.e., lower loan cost leads to higher supply chain
power, we identify customer-supplier relationships that are more susceptible to hold-up risk.
When a firm’s supply chain is more susceptible to hold-up risk, it is reasonable to argue that
the firm is more likely to face higher loan cost irrespective of banking relationships. It is well
known that the hold-up problem in a supply chain emerges when one firm in the relationship
is able to expropriate the returns from an investment made by another firm (Rogerson, 1992;
Klein, 1998; Williamson, 1985) and the condition of asset specificity is central to this problem
(Coase, 2006).
We identify firms in our sample that are more susceptible to hold-up risk based on the ex-
tent of their asset specificity. Following Kim and Kung (2017) and Kim (2018), we construct a
measure of firm-level asset specificity, where a higher degree of asset specificity implies lower
redeployability of assets outside the supply-chain relationship.29 We define a supply chain as
more susceptible to hold-up risk if both the supplier and the customer are in the top quartile of
their respective asset specificity measures.30 Similarly, we define a supply chain as not suscep-
tible to hold-up risk if both the supplier and the customer are in the bottom quartile of their
respective asset specificity measures.
Table 12 is about here
Table 12 reports our results on the effect of hold-up risk on the cost of bank loan, condi-
tional of firms’ supply chain power. Column (1) of the table shows that if a customer-supplier
29Available at: http://blogs.cornell.edu/hyunseobkim/asset-redeployability/
30We report the list of sample customer firms that are more susceptible to supply-chain hold-up risk in the Online Appendix.
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relationship is more susceptible to hold-up risk, the customer tends to have elevated credit risk
manifested by a higher cost of bank loans. In columns (2) and (3), we partition the sample
firms into high supply chain power (high-SCP) and low supply chain power (low-SCP) and re-
estimate our OLS model with the primary focus on the effect of hold-up risk on the cost of debt.
The results show that the detrimental effect of hold-up risk disappears for high-SCP firms but
remains persistent for low-SCP firms. Finally, in column (4), we interact supply chain power
with hold-up risk and find that higher supply chain power can attenuate the adverse effect of
hold-up risk on a firm’s cost of bank debt. We perform a similar experiment by partitioning
our sample firms into ‘hold-up’ and ‘no-hold-up’ and estimate our OLS model with the primary
focus on the effect of supply chain power on the cost of debt. Results in columns (5)-(7) show
that supply chain power reduces the cost of bank debt but the presence of hold-up risk can
significantly diminish the beneficial effects of supply chain power on the cost of bank debt.31
3.7. SUPPLY CHAIN POWER, LOAN SPREAD, AND THE SPECIFICITY OF SUPPLY CHAIN
The above analysis establishes the causal effect of supply chain power on the cost of bank
loans. However, it is well known that not all supply chains are the same. For instance, data
compiled by Bloomberg’s supply chain database (SPLC) show that general retailers such as
Walmart rely on hundreds of suppliers (732 for Walmart) while specialized retailers such as
Toys“R”Us rely on relatively fewer suppliers (26 for Toys“R”Us). Furthermore, Walmart’s cost
of goods sold (COGS) share from its top 10 COGS suppliers (in terms of relationship value)
is relatively more evenly distributed among those suppliers while for Toys“R”Us, two suppliers
(out of the top 10) account for most of its COGS share.32
These observations point to two key issues: first, a firm’s supply chain can be thickly popu-
lated (e.g., Walmart) giving the firm significant leverage to switch between suppliers at ease.
We label this type of supply chain as arm’s length. In contrast, a thinly populated supply
chain gives a firm little power to switch between suppliers, thereby effectively locking the firm
into a more relationship-specific chain. Second, the credit risk implications of supply chain
power may vary significantly depending on whether the firm relies on an arm’s-length or a
relationship-specific supply chain. This is because a relationship-specific supply chain reduces
31The number of observation in these regression analyses declines significantly due to the availability of the firm-level asset specificity data.
32See the Online Appendix for a list of top 10 suppliers of Wal-mart.
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supply-chain related uncertainty but also comes with reduced flexibility for the downstream
firm since the cost of production outside the relationship increases significantly (Klein, Craw-
ford, and Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1979, 1985). Furthermore, a relationship-specific supply
chain also requires relationship-specific investment and, as discussed earlier, the market liquid-
ity of relationship-specific assets declines significantly during financial distress as such assets
have little value outside the relationship (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). Therefore, a relationship-
specific supply chain can significantly increase the degree of counter-party risk within the sup-
ply chain (Boyarchenko and Costello, 2015). In contrast, an arm’s-length supply chain ensures
that both parties in the deal are acting in their own self-interest and are not subject to duress
from the other party, i.e., no party has any significant bargaining power, thereby increasing
supply-chain related uncertainty but also increasing operational flexibility. Furthermore, assets
related to an arm’s-length supply chain may not experience significant value loss in distress.
Therefore, how the effect of supply chain power on loan spread varies depending on the speci-
ficity of the supply chain, i.e., arm’s-length as opposed to relationship-specific, is an empirical
question.
To empirically measure supply chain specificity, we resort to an industry-level classification
metric, as most databases (e.g., Bloomberg’s SPLC) only provide relatively short histories of
firm-level supply-chain characteristics. We modify a measure developed by Nunn (2007) who
argues that if an input is sold on an exchange or reference-priced in trade publications, then
the market for the input is thick, with many alternative buyers and sellers. A thick market
for an intermediate input also implies that the transaction involving the input is arm’s-length
as opposed to relationship-specific. Following Nunn (2007), we measure the industry-level







, where θi j =
ui j
ui
, ui j is the value of input j used in industry i and ui is
the total value of all inputs used in industry i, Rnon−exchj is the proportion of input j that is not
either sold on an organized exchange or reference priced. A higher value of ISCSi implies
an arms’-length supply chain since the market for intermediate input for the final product i is
thick.33
33We report the distribution of ISCSi across 6-digit NAICS industries for the US manufacturing firms in the Online Appendix. For instance,
for a “Computer Storage” manufacturer (NAICS 334112), only 5.823% of intermediate inputs are either sold on organized exchanges or are
reference-priced, i.e., the production process is highly relationship-specific. In contrast, for an “Aluminum Sheet, Plate, and Foil” manufacturer
(NAICS 331315), 94.695% of intermediate inputs are sold on organized exchanges, i.e., the production process is primarily arm’s-length.
Therefore, we hypothesize that an aluminum foil manufacturer will have more real flexibility in adjusting inventory and production than a
computer-storage device manufacturer.
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Table 13 is about here
Table 13 reports the effects of supply chain power on loan spread depending on the relation-
ship specificity of the supply chain. To estimate the conditional effect (conditional on supply
chain specificity) of supply chain power using OLS, we create a firm-level dummy variable.
If a firm is embedded in an industry with supply chain specificity measure (ISCS) above the
75th percentile of its distribution, we classify the firm as more dependent on an arm’s-length
supply chain and denote the dummy variable as 1. In contrast, if a firm is embedded in an
industry with supply chain specificity measure below the 25th percentile of its distribution, we
classify the firm as more reliant on a relationship-specific supply chain and denote the dummy
variable as 0. The interaction of this dummy variable with our main measure of supply chain
power captures the effect of excessive reliance on arm’s-length supply chain as opposed to
relationship-specific supply chain for a firm.
The table shows that, irrespective of the specificity of the supply chain, supply chain power
reduces loan cost. Moreover, creditors value arm’s-length supply chains more favorably than
relationship-specific supply chains, suggesting that from creditors’ perspectives, the benefits
associated with the operational flexibility of an arm’s-length supply chain outweighs the costs of
such production-related arrangements. Interestingly, however, excessive reliance on an arm’s-
length supply chain by a high supply-chain-power firm appears to have a detrimental impact on
its loan cost. Overall, we conclude that a high degree of supply chain power reduces firm-level
external debt financing constraints on average, and the effect is augmented for high-supply-
chain-power firms that invest more in relationship-specific assets within the supply chain.
3.8. IS SUPPLY CHAIN POWER RELATED TO BANKRUPTCY RISK?
Our analysis so far has been geared towards establishing a causal and robust relationship
between a firm’s supply-chain structure and its cost of external bank-loan financing. We show,
through causal inferences and robust regression analysis, that supply-chain power indeed re-
duces the cost of bank loans and, by implication, also significantly affects firm-level credit risk.
A logical extension of this argument is that the credit risk implications of supply-chain power
should also be reflected in the expected bankruptcy risk of firms. Therefore, in this section, we
analyze whether supply-chain power significantly affects firm bankruptcy risk.
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Specifically, we construct 4 different measures of firm-level bankruptcy risk used extensively
in the accounting and finance literature. Following Altman (1968), we construct the Z-Score;
a higher value of the Z-Score implies a lower likelihood of default.34 Following Ohlson (1980),
we calculate the O-Score measure; a higher value of the O-Score measure implies a higher
likelihood of bankruptcy.35 We follow Bharath and Shumway (2008) and construct a distance-






, where V is the total value of the firm,
F is the face value of the firm’s debt, µ is the expected continuously compounded return on V ,
σV is the volatility of firm value, and T is the default risk forecasting horizon. A higher value
of DT D implies that the firm is further away from its default boundary and hence there is a
lower likelihood of default. Finally, we create a dummy variable indicating whether a firm has
an investment grade S&P long-term credit rating, which implies a lower likelihood of default.
Table 14 is about here
Panel A of Table 14 reports the correlation between loan spread and our four different
bankruptcy risk measures. It is obvious from the table that all measures of bankruptcy risk
are significantly correlated with loan spread and, as expected, the correlation analysis shows
that higher (lower) risk of bankruptcy is positively (negatively) associated with loan spread.
In panel B of the table, we report our OLS (specifications 1-3 and 5-7) and LOGIT (specifica-
tions 4 and 8) regression results where the dependent variable is one of the bankruptcy risk
measures and the primary independent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm
has high power in its supply chain. Across all specifications and bankruptcy-risk measures, the
results show that a higher degree of supply-chain power is associated with a lower likelihood
of default. These findings are consistent with our causal analysis earlier on the effects of supply
chain power on the cost of bank loans. The analysis presented here suggests that supply chain
power reduces bankruptcy risk, thereby lowering the credit risk of firms. Lower bankruptcy
risk, in turn, alleviates external financing constraints, leading to a lower bank-loan spread.
34ZSCORE = (1.2×X1)+(1.4×X2)+(3.3×X3)+(0.6×X4)+(1.0×X5), where X1 is defined as working capital/total assets, X2 is defined
as retained earnings/total assets, X3 is defined as earnings before interest and tax/total assets, X4 is defined as market value of equity/total
liabilities, and X5 is defined as sales/total assets.
35OSCORE = −1.32− (0.407× Size) + (6.03× T LTA)− (1.43×W C TA) + (0.0757× C LCA)− (1.72× DU M1)− (2.37× N I TA)− (1.83×
C F T L) + (0.285 × DU M2) − (0.521 × CHIN), where Size is defined as log(total assets /GNP price level index), T LTA is defined as total
liabilities/total assets, W C TA is defined as working capital (WC)/total assets (TA). C LCA is defined as current liabilities (CL)/current assets
(CA), N I TA is defined as net income (NI)/total assets (TA), C F T L is defined as cash flows from operation (CF)/total liabilities (TL), CHIN
is defined as N It − N It−1 divided by the sum of the absolute values of N It and N It−1. DU M1 is a dummy variable that is set equal to 1 if
total liabilities are greater than total assets, and 0 otherwise, while DU M2 is another dummy variable that is set equal to 1 if net income was
negative for the last two consecutive years, and 0 otherwise.
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4. HOW DOES SUPPLY CHAIN POWER AFFECT CREDIT RISK?
In the final stage of our analysis, we examine a potential channel through which supply
chain power affects the cost of external financing. Inventory-related risk is an important factor
for firm operations, and firms frequently restructure their supply chains to reduce the risk of a
disruption in inventory. For example, Barker and Campbell (2018) describe how, in the United
Kingdom (UK), firms such as Honda have explicitly mentioned the cost of inventory manage-
ment as a reason to restructure their supply chains away from the UK following Brexit. Prior
literature has shown that in addition to product-market competitiveness, inventory manage-
ment efficiency also affects the cost of external financing. Since we explicitly control for the
effect of product-market competition in previous sections, in this section we focus on inventory
management efficiency and use mediation analysis to show that supply chain power reduces
inventory-related risk for firms which, in turn, leads to lower credit risk and lower cost of debt.
It has been well documented in the finance and accounting literature that excess inventory
hurts the financial and operating performance of firms. Sloan (1996) documents that firms
with high levels of accruals, of which the change in inventories is one component, significantly
under-perform relative to those with low accruals. Thomas and Zhang (2002) show that the
component of accruals that seems to drive such under-performance is in fact the change in
inventories. Belo and Lin (2012) find that, after controlling for firm size, firms with higher
inventory growth earn lower returns. Jones and Tuzel (2013) examine the relation between
inventory investment and the cost of capital in the time series and the cross section; they show
that risk premiums of firms are strongly negatively related to future inventory growth at the
aggregate, industry, and firm levels. Constructing a production-based asset pricing model with
two types of capital, fixed capital and inventories, they argue that convex adjustment costs and
a counter-cyclical price of risk lead to negative time series and cross-sectional relations between
expected returns and inventory growth. Ak and Patatoukas (2016) show that manufacturers
with more concentrated customer bases hold smaller inventories for shorter time horizons
and are less likely to end up with excess inventories and subsequently, are associated with a
valuation premium.
Chopra and Sodhi (2004) argue that inventory risk hinges on three factors: first, the value
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of the product (holding excess inventory for products with high value can be very costly), sec-
ond, its rate of obsolescence (holding excess inventory for products with short life cycles can get
expensive), and finally, uncertainty of demand and supply (inventory risk increases remarkably
fast as product variety grows). Supply chain management is primarily about matching supply
and demand effectively. Too much supply leads to inefficient capital investment, expensive
markdowns, and needless handling costs, while too much demand generates opportunity costs
of lost margins (Cachon, 2004). A crucial component of the matching process between supply
and demand is a firm’s inventory control system and reliance on a supply chain enables firms to
mitigate inventory-related risk. Specifically, companies can minimize inventory risk by work-
ing with a highly responsive supplier, especially for high-value, short life-cycle products (Lai,
Debo, and Sycara, 2009). The literature on supply chain management and inventory control
converge on the idea that reliance on an effective supply chain is one of the most effective ways
of mitigating production risk related to inventory distortions (Chopra and Sodhi, 2004).
Combining insights from these different strands of literature, one can posit therefore that
supply chain power enables firms to reduce inventory risk. Better inventory control, in turn,
can alleviate firm-level external financing constraints. Based on the above discussion, we for-
mulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Supply chain power reduces inventory-related risk for firms more reliant on supply
chain management. Better inventory management, in turn, leads to lower cost of external debt
financing for such firms.
To empirically capture the firm’s inventory management efficiency and to test hypothesis
(1), we use the signal-to-noise ratio of inventory, i.e., the level of desired inventory (signal)
relative to the uncertainty associated with achieving the desired level (noise). We measure
signal as the average level of inventory in the last three years and the noise as the volatility
(standard deviation) of inventory over the last three years. We use quarterly Compustat data
to calculate both the signal and noise measures. The signal-to-noise ratio is then calculated as
the ratio of the historical average inventory level over the volatility of historical inventory. The
measure thus captures the stability of inventory management. We also calculate the signal-to-




To empirically identify the significance of the above mechanism, we follow the following
regression framework (Judd and Kenny, 1981; James and Brett, 1984; Baron and Kenny, 1986):
LSPREADl i j t = α+ β .SC Pi j t + κ.Ci j t +W
′δ+µ j + νt + εl i j t (8)
Ci j t = ω+φSC Pi j t +W
′γ+µ j + νt + εi j t (9)
where l indexes a loan, i indexes a firm, j indexes an industry, and t refers to time. LSPREADl i j t
is defined as log(All-in-Drawn), SC Pi j t is the measure of supply-chain power, Ci j t is a specific
channel in question, and W is the set of various firm- and loan-specific control variables. Empir-
ically, equation (9) captures the direct effect of supply-chain power on the firm-level channels
and equation (8) decomposes the baseline effect of SC Pi j t on loan spread into the channel
effect and the direct effect of SC Pi j t independent of a channel. By plugging (9) into (8), we
get:
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l i j t (10)






and ε∗l i j t = κ.εi j t+εl i j t .
In equation (10), β∗ is the same as the effect of SC Pi j t in the baseline model. However, the
decomposition in equation (10) shows that κ.φ of the effect is channeled through the measure
Ci j t and β is the remaining effect of SC Pi j t on loan spread. To estimate these parameters
separately, we estimate models (8) and (9) simultaneously by means of seemingly unrelated
regressions.
4.2. ESTIMATION RESULTS
Panels A and B of Table 15 show the unconditional mean differences for inventory man-
agement efficiency (INVMGT) and various loan-contract terms. It is obvious from panel A that
36We report our results using total investory signal-to-noise ratio while the results are similar using other definitions of inventory.
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high-SCP firms are more efficient in their inventory management than low-SCP firms suggest-
ing that supply-chain power is positively associated with its inventory control efficiency. In
panel B, the table shows the mean differences in various price and non-price loan-contract
terms between high and low levels of inventory management efficiency measure. Overall, the
summary statistics in the panel show that firms with higher level of inventory-management ef-
ficiency pay lower spreads on their loans than firms at the lower end of the inventory efficiency
spectrum. The univariate results reported in Table 15 suggest that the supply-chain power of
a firm is associated with lower inventory risk which, in turn, leads to lower loan spreads for
the firm.
Table 15 is about here
Panel C of Table 15 shows the decomposition of the effect of supply-chain power on the
cost of bank loans by estimating regression models (8) and (9) simultaneously in a seemingly
unrelated regression. We first report the baseline effect of supply-chain power on the cost of
bank loans, captured by the β∗ in model (10). We then report the effect of supply-chain power
on the inventory control efficiency itself, captured by the φ coefficient in model (9). Finally,
we decompose the effect of supply-chain power using model (8) into a direct (β) and an indi-
rect effect via inventory control efficiency (κ×φ) on the loan spread. The results show that
supply-chain power increases inventory-management efficiency, conditional on other firm- and
loan-specific controls. Moreover, consistent with the extant accounting and finance literature,
the results in specifications (3) and (6) show that lower inventory risk reduces spreads. Finally,
the decomposition analysis of the overall effect of supply-chain power into direct and indirect
effects via a channel (reported in specifications (3) and (6)) suggests that the direct effect of
supply-chain power on the cost of bank loans (β) is always negative and statistically significant
at the 1% level. Moreover, the indirect effects, captured by κ×φ, are also negative. However,






between specifications 1 and 3. These results suggest
that part of the overall effect of supply-chain power on the cost of bank loans is explained by
the inventory risk channel. Overall, the results in Table 15 suggest that supply chain power
matters for credit risk; it enables a firm to achieve a greater level of efficiency in its inventory
management which, in turn, leads to an elevated level of loan-market access for the firm.
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5. CONCLUSION
Fierce global competition, shorter product life-cycles, and heightened consumer expecta-
tions have been constantly pushing firms to improve efficiencies in order to remain competitive
in the global marketplace. One source of inefficiency lies in the network linking suppliers and
customers. Hence, firms have been increasingly more likely to adopt supply chain management
techniques over the last three decades. However in the last few years, a significant number of
global political events (Brexit, tariff wars, and trade treaty renegotiations) have increased the
risk that firms will need to drastically restructure their supply chains. This paper provides a
comprehensive analysis on how a firm’s economic links with its suppliers affect its provisions
for external debt financing.
Specifically, we provide granular-level evidence, using a comprehensive set of price and
non-price bank-loan contract terms, that the supply chain power of a firm eases the provisions
of bank financing, resulting in a lower spread, higher loan amounts, longer maturity, less collat-
eral, fewer restrictive covenants, and a higher likelihood of syndication and relationship-based
transactions. We show that these results are robust to controlling for product-market compe-
tition. We also show that supply chain power enables the firm to achieve a greater level of
control over its inventory management. Overall, the supply chain induced effect in these real
activities translates into an elevated level of debt market access for firms more reliant on these
types of production arrangements.
These results suggest that from the perspective of a unique financial stakeholder of the
firm, i.e., the bank, upstream (supply-side) interactions in the chain of business activities are
at least as important as downstream (demand-side) interactions in determining a firm’s debt
financing capacity. Our results shed light on the complex interplay of forces that determine why
some firms are financially constrained while others are not. Finally, we argue that the key to
understanding the origins of financing capacity of firms should not be limited to demand-side
attributes, but should naturally be extended to supply chain related interactions of firms.
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Table 1: Sample firms and loans: 1990-2012
This table describes our matched loan sample for the period 1990-2012 for which both the loan spread information
and the firm-level supply chain power (SC P) measure are available. Panel A reports the number of firms and loans
as well as the loan-to-firm ratio over the years. Panel B reports loan types and primary purposes. HSC P refers
to high level of power the firm has relative to its suppliers in the supply chain. A firm is defined as having high
supply-chain power if the firm-level SC P measure is above the 75th percentile of its sample distribution. LSC P
refers to low level of power relative to firms in the supply chain. A firm is defined as less powerful if the firm-level
SC P measure is below the 25th percentile of its sample distribution.
Panel A: Number of sample firms and loans
All firms High-SCP (HSCP) firms Low-SCP (LSCP) firms
# Firms # Loans # Loan/# Firms # Firms # Loans # Loan/# Firms # Firms # Loans # Loan/# Firms
1990 73 113 1.55 4 21 5.25 12 30 2.50
1991 70 96 1.37 4 10 2.50 11 39 3.55
1992 84 130 1.55 2 32 16.00 10 36 3.60
1993 127 192 1.51 7 37 5.29 18 58 3.22
1994 175 300 1.71 5 75 15.00 19 79 4.16
1995 174 281 1.61 5 76 15.20 18 66 3.67
1996 208 366 1.76 4 81 20.25 31 95 3.06
1997 272 485 1.78 12 126 10.50 30 129 4.30
1998 285 491 1.72 11 129 11.73 27 98 3.63
1999 321 592 1.84 17 156 9.18 16 146 9.13
2000 365 707 1.94 17 185 10.88 24 176 7.33
2001 410 773 1.89 21 228 10.86 28 166 5.93
2002 419 782 1.87 25 232 9.28 29 158 5.45
2003 427 795 1.86 30 217 7.23 27 189 7.00
2004 475 852 1.79 34 190 5.59 25 241 9.64
2005 435 810 1.86 25 220 8.80 36 189 5.25
2006 384 703 1.83 31 175 5.65 25 168 6.72
2007 355 696 1.96 24 169 7.04 26 175 6.73
2008 211 378 1.79 17 82 4.82 17 95 5.59
2009 167 261 1.56 13 57 4.38 10 81 8.10
2010 225 357 1.59 16 53 3.31 10 114 11.40
2011 346 541 1.56 31 113 3.65 21 148 7.05
2012 147 225 1.53 8 57 7.13 8 51 6.38
Panel B: Sample loan types and purposes
All firms HSC P firms LSC P firms
Num. % Num. % Num. %
Loan types:
Revolving credit facility 5115 46.81% 1127 41.42% 1403 51.45%
Term loans 2268 20.76% 457 16.80% 698 25.60%
364-Day facility 1843 16.87% 714 26.24% 314 11.51%
Note 245 2.24% 42 1.54% 65 2.38%
Bridge loan 217 1.99% 63 2.32% 62 2.27%
Others 1238 11.33% 318 11.69% 185 6.78%
Total 10926 100.00% 2721 100.00% 2727 100.00%
Loan purposes:
Corporate purposes 4588 41.99% 1128 41.46% 1066 39.09%
Debt repayment 1496 13.69% 338 12.42% 409 15.00%
Working capital financing 1344 12.30% 222 8.16% 429 15.73%
Commercial paper backup 1278 11.70% 499 18.34% 219 8.03%
Takeover financing 793 7.26% 182 6.69% 222 8.14%
LBO/Spinoff/Repurchase 379 3.47% 111 4.08% 98 3.59%
Acquisition/Equipment line 308 2.82% 55 2.02% 98 3.59%
Project finance/Lease Finance/Trade Finance 143 1.31% 45 1.65% 26 0.95%
Capital expenditure financing 92 0.84% 20 0.74% 39 1.43%
Recapitalization 83 0.76% 15 0.55% 24 0.88%
Others 422 3.86% 106 3.90% 97 3.56%
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Supply chain power and loan spread: Unconditional OLS
This table reports coefficients from OLS regressions on the effects of supply chain power on the cost of bank
loans. Panel A provides the baseline unconditional regression estimates while panel B controls for product-market
competition measure from Hoberg and Phillips (2010). The definitions of all firm- and loan-level variables are
given in Table A in the Appendix. t-statistics (with standard errors clustered at the firm and deal level) are given
in parentheses. ‘***’, ‘**’, and ‘*’ denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Log(All-in-Drawn) Log(TCB)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7 [8]
Panel A: Baseline OLS estimation
Supply chain power (SCP) -0.091*** -0.078***
[-5.49] [-4.86]
Log(Num. of suppliers) -0.400*** -0.365***
[-20.49] [-18.79]
Supply chain dispersion -0.530*** -0.475***
[-3.15] [-2.91]
Supply chain Lerner’s Index -4.361*** -3.883***
[-3.41] [-3.31]
Constant 4.377*** 4.607*** 5.577*** 7.412*** 3.954*** 4.164*** 5.327*** 6.657***
[34.49] [38.78] [20.45] [8.23] [30.67] [34.22] [19.42] [8.05]
Industry & year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 10926 10926 10926 10926 10926 10926 10926 10926
R2 0.12 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.10
Panel B: Controlling for product-market competition
Supply chain power (SCP) -0.160*** -0.154***
[-7.95] [-8.02]
Log(Num. of suppliers) -0.433*** -0.393***
[-16.93] [-15.60]
Supply chain dispersion -0.737*** -0.699***
[-3.33] [-3.33]
Supply chain Lerner’s Index -5.581*** -5.593***
[-2.40] [-2.60]
HHI -2.779*** -1.513*** -2.472*** -2.962*** -2.429*** -1.266** -2.295*** -2.599***
[-4.29] [-2.71] [-2.81] [-4.49] [-3.86] [-2.32] [-2.68] [-4.06]
Constant 5.248*** 5.464*** 6.218*** 9.101*** 4.928*** 5.089*** 6.826*** 8.790***
[23.31] [26.74] [12.92] [5.62] [21.51] [41.23] [13.31] [5.84]
Industry & year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5695 5695 5695 5695 5695 5695 5695 5695
R2 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.08
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Table 6: Supply chain power and loan spread: Conditional OLS
This table reports coefficients from OLS regressions on the effects of supply chain power on the cost of bank loans
conditional on firms and loan characteristics and product-market competition. The definitions of all firm- and
loan-level variables are given in Table A in the Appendix. t-statistics (with standard errors clustered at the firm
and deal level) are given in parentheses. ‘***’, ‘**’, and ‘*’ denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
Log(All-in-Drawn) Log(TCB)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Supply chain power (SCP) -0.113*** -0.045*** -0.057*** -0.100*** -0.043*** -0.055***
[-7.03] [-4.37] [-3.75] [-6.67] [-4.17] [-3.79]
HHI -0.885** -0.791**
[-2.27] [-2.06]
Total assets ($ billion) -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001* -0.002***
[-3.90] [-2.82] [-3.05] [-2.95] [-1.83] [-3.56]
Tobin’s Q -5.970*** -3.971*** -0.149*** -5.630*** -5.865*** -0.135***
[-10.50] [-9.96] [-7.22] [-9.76] [-13.44] [-6.67]
Book leverage 0.719*** 0.202*** 0.160* 0.777*** 0.372*** 0.145*
[7.68] [3.11] [1.85] [8.14] [5.35] [1.64]
Profitability -0.342** -0.083 -0.295** -0.304** 0.027 -0.299***
[-2.22] [-0.91] [-2.29] [-2.07] [0.27] [-2.38]
Tangibility -0.181** -0.065 -0.150* -0.145* -0.138** -0.124
[-2.19] [-1.13] [-1.81] [-1.75] [-2.25] [-1.53]
Current ratio 0.194*** 0.076*** 0.078*** 0.171*** 0.070*** 0.072***
[10.42] [5.92] [4.48] [8.95] [5.14] [3.93]
Interest coverage ratio -0.212*** -0.177*** -0.163*** -0.204*** -0.126*** -0.154***
[-9.48] [-11.66] [-8.04] [-8.91] [-7.77] [-7.31]
Expected default frequency (EDF) 0.602*** 0.261*** 0.274*** 0.585*** 0.347*** 0.252***
[11.76] [6.50] [4.43] [11.05] [8.36] [4.19]
Loan amount ($ million) -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002***
[-18.28] [-13.23] [-13.61] [-11.51]
Loan maturity -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
[-4.99] [-4.88] [-7.45] [-5.08]
Collateral dummy 0.524*** 0.598*** 0.422*** 0.506***
[23.92] [19.10] [18.59] [16.37]
Big 3 lender dummy -0.073*** -0.092*** -0.090*** -0.080***
[-3.14] [-2.95] [-3.64] [-2.56]
Relationship-loan dummy -0.039*** -0.026 -0.079*** -0.022
[-2.50] [-1.19] [-4.63] [-1.07]
Constant 10.637*** 11.291*** 8.234*** 10.233*** 12.868*** 4.578***
[17.44] [24.33] [29.78] [16.75] [27.41] [13.39]
Industry & year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan types and purposes dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered by firm and deal Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7466 6956 3855 7466 6956 3855























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8: Demand- and supply-side market power and the cost of debt
This table reports the estimates of the effects of product-side and supply-side market power on a firm’s cost of
external debt financing. The product-market power is captured by Hoberg and Phillips’s (2010) HHI index and
the supply-side power is measured by the SCP variable described in the main text of the paper. t-statistics (with
standard errors clustered at the firm and deal level) are given in parentheses. ‘***’, ‘**’, and ‘*’ denote significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
[1] [2] [3] [4]
HHI effect conditional on SC PHigh (βH) -2.129***
[-3.96]
HHI effect conditional on SC PLow−High (βL − βH) 2.186***
[3.11]
CUST CON effect conditional on SC PHigh (βH) 0.03
[0.51]
CUST CON effect conditional on SC PLow−High (βL − βH) -0.128*
[-1.61]
SC P effect conditional on HHIHigh (βH) -0.048***
[-3.06]
SC P effect conditionla on HHILow−High (βL − βH) -0.080**
[-2.31]
SC P effect conditional on CUST CONHigh (βH) -0.035***
[-2.74]
SC P effect conditional on CUST CONLow−High (βL − βH) 0.011
[0.27]
Firm and loan characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan types and purposes dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
SC PLow dummy variable Yes Yes No No
HHILow dummy variable No No Yes No
CUST CONLow dummy variable No No No Yes
SC PLow × firm and loan characteristics Yes Yes No No
HHILow × firm and loan characteristics No No Yes No
CUST CONLow × firm and loan characteristics No No No Yes
Industry & year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3856 4146 3856 4146
R2 0.72 0.67 0.71 0.66
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Table 9: Supply chain power and loan spread: Instrumental variables (IV) analysis
This table reports coefficients from IV regressions on the effects of supply chain power on the cost of bank loans.
The definitions of all firm- and loan-level variables are given in Table A in the Appendix. t-statistics (with standard
errors clustered at the firm and deal level) are given in parentheses. ‘***’, ‘**’, and ‘*’ denote significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
IV analysis – I IV analysis – II
First-stage Second-stage First-stage Second-stage
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Suppliers’ geographical dispersion (IV) 0.031***
[4.55]
Supply chain minority interest (IV) -0.739***
[-2.73]
Supply chain power (SCP) – IV -0.648*** -1.108***
[-3.13] [-5.88]
Total assets ($ billion) 0.003*** -0.001 0.002*** 0.001
[3.48] [-0.74] [4.89] [1.56]
Tobin’s Q 0.004 -0.167*** -0.016 -0.283***
[0.10] [-4.37] [-0.67] [-8.56]
Book leverage -0.276* -0.179 -0.071 0.547***
[-1.63] [-1.06] [-0.83] [4.50]
Profitability -0.472** -0.473** -0.778*** -1.116***
[-2.09] [-2.03] [-5.96] [-4.63]
Tangibility -0.073 0.216 -0.1 -0.239**
[-0.42] [1.31] [-1.12] [-1.90]
Current ratio 0.01 0.097*** -0.019 0.078***
[0.32] [3.16] [-1.02] [2.92]
Interest coverage ratio -0.049 -0.258*** 0.054*** -0.052*
[-1.33] [-7.13] [2.71] [-1.87]
Expected default frequency (EDF) -0.084 0.270*** -0.048 0.502***
[-0.74] [2.52] [-0.93] [6.90]
Loan amount ($ million) 0.000 -0.002*** 0.001*** -0.001***
[-0.39] [-6.03] [5.25] [-4.35]
Loan maturity 0.000 0.000 0.002*** -0.003***
[-0.15] [-0.34] [2.58] [-3.46]
Collateral dummy -0.208*** 0.343*** -0.217*** 0.288***
[-3.83] [5.01] [-7.47] [4.84]
Big 3 lender dummy 0.300*** -0.058 0.101*** 0.002
[4.74] [-0.68] [3.34] [0.05]
Relationship-loan dummy 0.027 -0.059* -0.003 -0.104***
[0.74] [-1.69] [-0.12] [-3.48]
Constant -0.888 7.015*** 0.598 6.458***
[-0.89] [8.98] [0.54] [6.93]
Industry & year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan types and purposes dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.42 0.64 0.166 0.236
N 1535 1535 3923 3923
Weak-instrument test:
First-stage F-stat 20.67 5.27
[0.00] [0.00]
First-stage partial R2 1.45% 1.50%
Endogeneity test:
Durbin χ2 14.23 68.55
[0.00] [0.00]
Wu-Hausman F-stat 13.29 67.59
[0.00] [0.00]
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Table 10: Supply chain power and non-price loan contract terms
This table reports coefficients from simultaneous regression estimates of price (loan spread) and non-price (ma-
turity and collateral) loan contract terms. The definitions of all firm- and loan-level variables are given in Table A
in the Appendix. t-statistics (with standard errors clustered at the firm and deal level) are given in parentheses.
‘***’, ‘**’, and ‘*’ denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Spread Eq. Maturity Eq. Collateral Eq.
OLS IV IV (HHI) OLS IV IV (HHI) PROBIT IV IV (HHI)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Supply chain power (SC P) -0.041*** -0.052*** -0.097*** 0.671*** 0.561*** 0.976** -0.169*** -0.169*** -0.201***
[-5.21] [-6.30] [-5.87] [3.00] [2.50] [2.28] [-8.07] [-8.06] [-4.54]
Total assets ($ billion) -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.017** -0.022*** -0.022* -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.021***
[-3.59] [-7.03] [-3.23] [-2.32] [-2.85] [-1.61] [-5.39] [-6.14] [-6.87]
Tobin’s Q -3.958*** -4.204*** -0.126*** -17.834** -23.098*** 0.6 -4.339*** -5.348*** -0.03
[-12.20] [-11.66] [-5.04] [-1.94] [-2.47] [1.03] [-4.92] [-5.72] [-0.39]
Book leverage 0.213*** 0.990*** 0.773*** 14.624*** 15.366*** 14.570*** 0.548*** 1.544*** 2.023***
[3.95] [7.93] [3.93] [9.66] [10.03] [6.18] [3.89] [4.68] [3.62]
Profitability -0.099 0.021 0.012 -0.772 -1.472 -0.611 -0.671*** -0.610*** -0.683
[-1.35] [0.27] [0.08] [-0.37] [-0.70] [-0.17] [-3.27] [-2.97] [-1.57]
Tangibility -0.073 0.257*** 0.072 1.816 1.079 0.236 -0.516*** -0.209 -0.159
[-1.56] [4.32] [0.82] [1.36] [0.80] [0.11] [-3.99] [-1.31] [-0.61]
Current ratio 0.072*** 0.004 0.003 -0.707*** -0.44 -0.227 0.166*** 0.122*** 0.085*
[7.19] [0.34] [0.17] [-2.49] [-1.48] [-0.49] [6.38] [4.17] [1.68]
Interest coverage ratio -0.181*** -0.097*** -0.143*** 1.286*** 0.980*** -0.275 -0.194*** -0.136*** -0.238***
[-15.36] [-6.72] [-6.71] [3.87] [2.82] [-0.50] [-6.25] [-3.82] [-4.06]
Expected default frequency (EDF) 0.248*** -0.285*** -0.042 -5.852*** -4.543*** -3.295** 0.837*** 0.380*** 0.109
[7.35] [-4.44] [-0.43] [-6.14] [-4.34] [-2.06] [9.71] [2.33] [0.41]
Loan amount ($ million) -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.008*** 0.004 0.005 -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.001





Maturity (IV) -0.073*** -0.051*** -0.079*** -0.143***
[-8.08] [-3.46] [-3.25] [-3.39]
Collateral (IV) 1.115*** 1.109*** -4.933*** -9.920***
[16.17] [10.71] [-2.64] [-3.73]
Big-3 lender dummy -0.087*** 0.142*** 0.058 2.321*** 2.041*** 2.022*** -0.189*** 0.036 0.283*
[-4.70] [4.44] [1.08] [4.42] [3.82] [2.47] [-3.96] [0.44] [1.87]
Relationship lending dummy -0.038*** -0.022 -0.039 0.337 0.317 -1.343** -0.018 -0.001 -0.292***
[-2.66] [-1.47] [-1.44] [0.84] [0.79] [-2.24] [-0.47] [-0.03] [-3.80]
HHI 1.065* 19.944* 2.218
[1.74] [1.80] [1.25]
Constant 9.856*** 18.110*** 9.002*** 75.477*** 83.860*** 17.29 4.353*** 9.596*** 7.607***
[17.27] [13.60] [7.86] [4.68] [5.12] [0.83] [3.42] [4.72] [3.43]
Industry & Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan types and purposes dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered by firm and deal Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2/Pseudo-R2 0.68 0.66 0.68 0.63 0.63 0.69 0.32 0.32 0.4
N 6793 6793 2870 6793 6793 2870 6779 6779 2869
First-stage IV results:
Log(Asset maturity) 0.911** 0.911** 0.911**
[1.97] [1.97] [1.97]
Regulated industry dummy -3.953*** -3.953*** -3.953***
[-3.64] [-3.64] [-3.64]


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 12: Supply chain hold-up risk and loan spread
This table reports the effects of supply-chain power on the cost of bank debt in the presence of supply-chain
hold-up risk. We follow Kim and Kung (2016) and Kim (2018) to construct the measure of firm-level asset
specificity. We define a supply chain as more susceptible to hold-up risk if both the suppliers and the customer
are in the top quartile of their respective asset specificity measure. Alternatively, we define a supply chain as less
susceptible to hold-up risk if both the suppliers and the customer are in the bottom quartile of their respective
asset specificity measures. Robust t statistics are given in brackets; ‘*’ denotes significance at the 10% level; ‘**’
denotes significance at the 5% level; and ‘***’ denotes significance at the 1% level.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
All HIGH-SCP LOW-SCP (2) × (3) HOLDUP No-HOLDUP (5) × (6)
firms firms firms interaction firms firms interaction
HOLDUP 0.149*** 0.087 0.356*** 0.205** 0.132***
[2.67] [0.62] [3.31] [2.28] [2.37]
SCP -0.013 -0.005 -0.136** -0.211***
[-0.46] [-0.17] [-2.07] [-3.09]
SCP × HOLDUP -0.169**
[-2.11]
HOLDUP × HIGHSCP 0.195***
[2.66]
Constant 8.536*** 6.883*** 6.554*** 7.491*** 7.140*** 8.739*** 7.447***
[7.74] [4.37] [5.99] [6.37] [5.97] [8.33] [6.34]
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1135 240 379 619 675 460 1135











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 14: Supply chain power and bankruptcy risk
This table reports coefficients from OLS regressions on the effects of supply chain power on various traditional
measures of bankruptcy risk. Panel A of the table shows the correlation between loan spread and bankruptcy risk
measures. Panel B shows the conditional OLS estimates of the effects of SC P on the likelihood of bankruptcy. The
definitions of all firm- and loan-level variables are given in Table A in the Appendix. t-statistics (with standard
errors clustered at the firm and deal level) are given in parentheses. ‘***’, ‘**’, and ‘*’ denote significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Loan spread and bankruptcy risk measures correlation
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
[1] Log(All-in-Drawn) 1
[2] Log(TCB) 0.976 1
[0.00]
[3] z-score -0.1096 -0.1152 1
[0.00] [0.00]
[4] o-score 0.3326 0.3298 -0.4897 1
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
[5] Distance-to-default (DT D) -0.3484 -0.338 0.3445 -0.3604 1
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
[6] Investment-grade rating -0.4584 -0.4088 0.0221 -0.2435 0.2308 1
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Panel B: Supply chain power and bankruptcy risk
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
z-score o-score DTD Rating z-score o-score DTD Rating
HSCP 0.321*** -0.833*** 1.150*** 2.027*** 0.200*** -0.557*** 0.554*** 1.183***
[2.70] [-10.51] [7.05] [22.91] [2.82] [-11.94] [4.18] [8.44]
Total assets ($ billion) -0.003*** -0.008*** 0.001 0.094***
[-3.19] [-12.94] [0.47] [10.84]
Tobin’s Q 2.271*** -0.147*** 1.449*** 0.342***
[40.71] [-4.01] [12.80] [3.16]
Book leverage -3.058*** 4.029*** -4.197*** -1.041***
[-13.86] [27.96] [-10.05] [-2.55]
Profitability -0.541** -3.162*** 0.055 1.134**
[-2.05] [-17.24] [0.10] [2.15]
Tangibility 0.708*** -1.021*** 1.563*** 0.588*
[4.16] [-8.88] [4.79] [1.80]
Current ratio 0.839*** -0.733*** 0.039 -0.453***
[20.70] [-26.84] [0.43] [-5.31]
Interest coverage ratio 0.533*** -0.376*** 0.624*** 0.419***
[10.50] [-11.30] [6.22] [4.23]
Competitive industry dummy 0.564*** -0.276*** 0.335* -0.14 -0.155** 0.397*** -0.572*** -0.314**
[3.92] [-2.83] [1.69] [-1.26] [-1.94] [7.59] [-3.69] [-2.12]
Constant 3.885*** 1.835** 1.669 -1.119*** -1.598*** 2.167*** 1.490* -2.837***
[6.01] [2.18] [1.37] [-7.26] [-3.97] [3.15] [1.79] [-7.41]
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2633 2825 2216 2817 2192 2186 1751 2075
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A: Definitions of Variables
Variables Definitions
Firm Characteristics:
Firm size Total book assets (in $ billions); Compustat data item: at.
Tobin’s Q (Market value of equity plus the book value of debt)/Total assets; Compustat data items: (at− ceq+prcc×
csho)/at.
Book leverage (Long-term Debt + Debt in current liabilities)/Total assets; Compustat data items: (dl t t + dlc)/at.
Profitability EBITDA/Total assets; Compustat data items: oibdp/at.
Asset tangibility Net Property, plant and equipment/Total assets; Compustat data items: ppent/at.
Current ratio Current assets/Current liabilities; Compustat data items: act/lc t.
Interest coverage ratio EBITDA/Interest expenses; Compustat data items: oibdp/x int.
Expected default frequency (EDF) EDF is calculated following Bharath and Shumway’s (2008) naive EDF estimation procedure.
S&P credit rating dummy Dummy variable indicating 1 if the firm has long-term S&P credit rating.
Loan Characteristics:
Log (Spread) Log(AIS Drawn over LIBOR); All-in-Drawn is the spread charged by the bank over LIBOR for the drawn
portion of the loan facility obtained from the LPC database.
Log (TCB) Log(Total cost of borrowing); the TCB is defined following Berg, Saunders, and Steffen (2013).
Facility amount Loan facility amount (in $ millions) obtained from the LPC database.
Maturity The maturity period (in months) of the bank loan obtained from the LPC database.
Security type dummy One dummy variable for each collateral type. For firms with missing collateral information in DealScan, we
classify them into one group and use a dummy variable to indicate those firms.
Security dummy Dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the loan facility is secured with collateral, and zero
otherwise. For firms with missing collateral information in DealScan, we replace the dummy variable with
zero.
Number of covenants Total number of covenants in a loan.
Number of general covenants Total number of general covenants in a loan. General covenants are restrictions on prepayment, dividend,
and voting rights. Prepayment covenants usually specify that a loan must be repaid from a specific source
such as equity issuance, excess cash flow, excess asset sales, excess debt issuance, or insurance proceeds
related to the collateral. The dividend covenant limits the payment of dividends. The covenants on vot-
ing rights mandate the percentage of lenders required to approve the changes of the items in the loan
agreement, such as term changes and collateral release.
Number of financial covenants Total number of financial covenants in a loan. It counts the number of limits placed on the level of different
accounting variables or ratios that must be maintained while the debt is outstanding.
Number of lenders Total number of lenders in a loan contract.
Big-3 lenders A dummy variable indicating whether the lead bank is any of the three major U.S. banks, i.e., the Bank of
America, Citigroup, and J.P. Morgan Chase.
Loan-type dummy Dummy variable indicating loan types such as term loan, revolver greater than one year, revolver less than
one year, and 364-day facility.
Loan-purpose dummy Dummy Variable for each loan purpose, including Debt repayment, Corporate purpose, and Working capital.
Other Independent Variables:
ISCS The industry-level supply-chain specificity measure. The measure is constructed based on Nunn (2007). It
measures the fraction of intermediary inputs (or broadly defined as assets) used in the production of the
final six-digit NAICS product that is either sold in an organized market or reference priced. In other words,
it captures the extent to which a firm may need to rely on arm’s-length as opposed to relationship-specific
supply chain in any given industry.
SC P The firm-level supply chain power measure. The measure is constructed based on the first Principal Com-
ponent of three firm-level variables related to the firm’s supply chain: (i) Log(1+ Number suppliers), which
captures the thickness of the supply chain; (ii) input-based Herfindahl index, which captures the dispersion
among suppliers; and (iii) input-weighted Lerner’s index, which captures a firm’s market power over its
suppliers.
U IN DEX The uncertainty index is from Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016). The index is based on the following se-
ries: (i) monthly news articles containing ‘uncertain’ or ‘uncertainty’, ‘economic’ or ‘economy’, and policy-
relevant terms (scaled by the smoothed number of articles containing ‘today’); (ii) the number of tax laws
expiring in coming years; (iii) the interquartile ranges for quarterly forecasts of federal government ex-
penditures from the Philadelphia Fed Survey of Forecasters; (iv) a composite of interquartile ranges for
quarterly forecasts of 1-year CPI from the Philadelphia Fed Survey of Forecasters.
HHI A sales-based Herfindahl index to measure industry concentration. Following Valta (2012), we use the fitted
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of Hoberg and Phillips (2016) to capture product-market competition.
A higher value of the index indicates a concentrated with a few dominant players.
CUST CON This is another measure of product-market competition based on the customer concentration measure of
Patatoukas (2012).
INV MGT A measure of inventory management efficiency captured by the signal-to-noise ratio of inventory, where
signal is the average level of inventory in the last three years and noise is the volatility (standard deviation)
of inventory over the last three years. The measure is calculated using the quarterly Compustat data.
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